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AN INTERNATIONAL PALESTINIAN MONTHLY MAGAZINE

THE RETURN



IN MEMORY OF
ABU JIHAD

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by Hatem Hussaini

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Palestinian "Strike Force" parading in the village of Sa'ir near Hebron.

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Publisher & Founder
Raymonda H. Tawil

Editor-in-Chief
Bishara A. Bahbah, Ph.D.

Editorial Board

John D. Law
Writer
International Consultant

The Honorable Talcott Seelye
Former U.S. Foreign Service Officer

Mohamed Hakki
Journalist

Samer Burgan
Attorney

Mailing Address:
Jerusalem Press Service
865 National Press Building ° Washington, D.C. 20045
Telephone: (202) 783-2511 Fax: (202) 783-2514

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photo by Neal Cassidy



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Publishers are urged to send books relating to the Middle East for reviews.

While Americans and Israelis are Stalling, Palestinians are Getting Killed

Washington, D.C. was buzzing with visitors from the Middle East in April. President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel, and King Hussein of Jordan were all guests of U.S. President George Bush.

The focus of discussion was peace between Arabs and Israelis, and primarily, the issue of the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On numerous occasions Bush made it clear, much to the displeasure of his Israeli guest, that the United States supports an exchange of territory for peace. Shamir does not want to relinquish control of any of the territory Israel now occupies.

Despite this key difference between the U.S. and Israeli approaches, the United States expressed support for an Israeli proposal that calls for West Bank elections to choose Palestinians to negotiate with the Israelis for limited self-government.

Only days after Shamir's departure from Washington, his top political advisor, Yosef Ben-Aharon, declared that Israel would not agree to hold Middle East peace negotiations on the basis of the "land for peace" formula.

If Shamir has unequivocally indicated that he opposes the very basis of the U.S. approach to peace in the Middle East, why then did Bush support Shamir's proposal for limited elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? After all, is it not apparent, that what Israel wants more than anything is land—not peace?

Some explanations for the Bush administration's approach include—

1) the belief that peace can only be achieved through a *process* of small achievements,
2) a fear of appearing as though the United States is pressuring Israel or dictating to it,
3) a perception of the Middle East as a nonpriority foreign policy item that must, however, be dealt with, and
4) the desire to help Israel buy time, while it tries to cope with the consequences of the *Intifadah*.

On the other hand, the Israelis know that what they want is territory, and what the Palestinians want is the same territory. The more they can stall the peace process, the more time they will have to defuse the highly explosive *Intifadah*.

And while the Bush administration and the Israeli government are engaged in a time-consuming process, Palestinians are getting killed, maimed, injured, imprisoned, and harassed—daily. Therefore, so long as those suffering are the Palestinians—not the Israelis—both the Israeli and U.S. governments can afford to squabble all they want over the future of the Palestinian people.

For the Palestinians, there is only one option. This option does not include wasting valuable time and lives while the Israelis engage in a futile search for "local Palestinian leadership." The Palestinians cannot afford to go along with the U.S. approach—talking about peace, but refusing to support the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Palestinian victims of Israeli brutality. photo by Judith Gabriel

The only option available to the Palestinians is to continue to take charge of their own destiny, as they have done throughout the *Intifadah*. Particularly as it affects Israel, history has taught us that the only way Israel is likely to leave the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is if its occupation of those territories becomes prohibitively expensive, in loss of money and loss of life.

Israel's invasion of Lebanon is a case in point. The only reason the Israelis retreated from most of Lebanon was not so much because the Israeli public abhorred occupying another country, but because on average Israel was losing a soldier a day.

Let us hope that both the Bush administration and the Israeli government realize that there will be no end to the *Intifadah* unless Israel withdraws completely from the territories it occupied in 1967. Otherwise, there is no guarantee that there will be no further bloodshed—Palestinian as well as Israeli blood. □

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

I take this opportunity to congratulate you on *The Return* and commend you on your efforts to serve the Palestinian community in the United States.

I believe that the connotation of the words we use are as important as the words themselves. Sometimes we are victimized by certain words that constantly appear in widely circulated reports. The two words I have in mind are "deport" and "expel."

On page 17 of the February issue, you published an Update on the Palestinian Municipalities. The report states that Mohammad Milhem was "deported" in 1980.

However, the word "expelled" is a more appropriate word to describe this act. Aliens are "deported"; natives are "expelled." "Deportation" does not necessarily connote force and violence. "Expulsion" on the other hand does.

Sami M. Odeh
Orange, California

A Tribute to Abu Jihad

Raymonda H. Tawil

Abu Jihad with his wife, Intisar; his daughter, Hanan; and his youngest son, Nidal.

They killed Abu Jihad. The Mossad, the Israeli secret police, miscalculated foolishly when they decided to carry out their terrorist act. That dark night of April 15, a special Israeli military force invaded Tunisia, a sovereign country, and committed the most atrocious crime. They fired 70 bullets at a great Palestinian leader.

Abu Jihad [Khalil Al-Wazir] was a revolutionary, a freedom fighter, and a man who believed in liberation and self-determination for his people. They assassinated a leader, but they could not assassinate his gifts to the Palestinian people; they could not assassinate the values of the *Intifadah*.

Abu Jihad was writing a letter to the leaders of the *Intifadah* when the criminals invaded his home. He had only written the first three lines, guiding and blessing the resistance, and he was watching a video recording of the children of the stones in action.

From its creation until now, Israel has maimed and killed thousands of Palestinians, and it has made them refugees, scattering them throughout the world. Along with Abu Ammar [Yasser Arafat], Abu Jihad helped to found Fatah. Abu Jihad helped to save the Palestinians from the suffering of refugeedom and exile, and from the misery and humiliation of waiting in line for UNRWA food rations.

Abu Jihad was killed, but he did not die. A martyr does not die. In the mythologies of all cultures, martyrs outlive their contemporaries. Besides, he left behind him a school of thought—his ideas. He lives in the heart of his people, his name is known in every home, his picture hangs on the walls of every village and town in occupied Palestine and in Beirut and Damascus refugee camps. He was a strong leader, determined and wise, a brother in the struggle.

The image of the defiant Palestinian, confronting his occupiers, is a welcome replacement for the ragged image of the subdued and beaten refugee. Abu Jihad proudly thrust forward his chest to receive the bullets that killed him, and he stretched out his hands to hold the hands of a long line of martyrs: some shot, some burned, some blown to bits, some too young to understand why they were being killed.

We feel his presence today, and

we will continue to feel his presence tomorrow, through thousands of his disciples—students of the *Intifadah*, sons of the revolution—whom he taught and guided, with patience and tender care. He has shaped the children of the stones with its own strong will.

He is one of the few who not only dreamed of the revolution, but worked to make it happen. He offered his life so that the dream could be fulfilled—on Palestinian soil.

Abu Jihad helped organize the people and orchestrated the *Intifadah*'s stones of fire. He was patient and he knew how to mobilize for political action. He never gave up hope that the state would be formed one day. He illuminated the Palestinian road for many years to come—the difficult road of revolution.

The Palestinian people learned to be revolutionary the hard way, in the poor wretched camps of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. The dispersion of the Palestinian people, their losses, their unrealized dreams of peace and dignity, and their love for humanity have left the Palestinians on their own. They know that they themselves must struggle for their freedom. The Palestinian people will get bread from the rocks if they must, and they will eat cactuses if they run out of bread.

When Abu Jihad presided over the Jordanian Palestinian Joint Committee in Amman, he used his powers to promote tourism, business development, factories, hospitals, and hotels. He received the bourgeois as well as the working classes, offering the same respect. He encouraged writers, painters, and other artists. He helped the young to develop into new leaders. He believed in the individual, and he encouraged individuality. And always, he worked to focus all Palestinian efforts on the liberation of Palestine.

Abu Jihad did not die. He lives on in the conscience of his people. The *Intifadah* was not killed by his assassins. It was fueled to burn more fiercely, to be more determined to resist occupation, to demand the creation of a Palestinian state—to fulfill the dreams for which he lived and died.

Abu Jihad was not with Abu Ammar in Algeria last November 15, to witness the birth of the Palestinian state. The Palestine National Council met and named its special session in his honor.

Um Jihad, Intisar, that great woman, his ultimate companion in the struggle, once took command of Fatah while her husband was in jail with all his colleagues and his dear friend, Abu Ammar. The jailed leaders confided in that great woman and trusted her to continue leading the revolution. She, like her husband, proved her ability to lead, and all the while, she made

*See **ABU JIHAD**, Page 38*

Abu Jihad (Khalil Al-Wazir).

Profile of
President Yasser Arafat

Hatem Hussaini

As PLO chairman and the recently declared president of the State of Palestine, Yasser Arafat, also known as Abu Ammar, has emerged as one of the best-known world leaders in contemporary history. What he says and does affects not only states but major international organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic States, the Arab League and the nonaligned countries. He represents not only the Paslestinian national struggle, but also embodies the aspirations of oppressed people around the world.

Who is Yasser Arafat and what makes him such a powerful man? What influences his thinking and why does he behave the way he does? Zionists try to discredit him, while Palestinian nationalists glorify him. His enemies portray him as an evil man, a "terrorist," a "murderer," while his admirers portray him as a hero and a fighter. He also has many critics that lie between these two extremes. Many books and articles have been written about him from just about every political point of view. However, very little is known about Yasser Arafat's personal history.

Hatem Hussaini was director of the Palestine Information Office in Washington, D.C. from 1978 to 1982. He is currently a professor of Political Science at Shaw University in North Carolina.

The Formative Years

Historians still disagree as to where Yasser Arafat was born. Alan Hart, in his book, *Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?*, writes that he was born in Cairo on August 24, 1929. Another biographer, Riyadh Al-Rayyes, in his book *Guerrillas for Palestine*, writes that he was born in Jerusalem. But whether he was born in Cairo or Jerusalem, he was born a Palestinian.

His given name is Mohammad, and his father, Abdul Raouf Arafat Al-Qudwa, was from Gaza, Palestine. The name "Yasser" was given to him as a nickname—it means "easy going."

Until he was four years old, he lived in Cairo with his six brothers and sisters. In 1933, his mother died and his family moved to Jerusalem where he lived with his uncle. But in 1940, he was back in Cairo.

Between 1946 and 1948, while he was in his late teens, Arafat defended his people in the war waged by Zionists who wanted to uproot the native population and establish the state of Israel. He organized and mobilized other young Palestinians to fight the Zionists. He also smuggled desperately needed weapons from Egypt into Palestine.

Arafat was influenced by the leader of the Palestinian Resistance (Al-Jihad Al-Mukadas) Abdul Qader Al Hussaini who was killed at the Al-Qastal battle in April 1948. Abdul Qader was an able and influential military leader. He led his fighters into battle in defense of Palestinian villages and towns. Always short on weapons, he sold some of his own property to buy badly needed weapons and fought bitter battles with Zionist military forces in different villages and towns in Palestine.

In later years, Arafat kept an eye on Abdul Qader's family and his four orphaned children. He visited them in Cairo regularly and continued to offer them any needed assistance.

Arafat Proclaimed President of Palestine



On April 2, the PLO Central Committee elected PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat president of the State of Palestine. According to Sheikh Abdel Hamid Al-Sayeh, chairman of the Palestine National Council, the vote for Arafat was unanimous.

The move by the PLO Central Committee is seen as an important step in reaffirming and implementing the decisions taken by the Palestine National Council in Algiers on November 15, 1988. During the meeting in Algiers, the Palestine National Council empowered the 77-member Central Committee to establish a provisional government for the the newly declared state. □

The Secretive Years (1956-67)

Yasser Arafat's young adulthood—1956 to 1967, when he was 26 to 38 years old—continued to be influenced by political conflict and war. In October 1956, he witnessed the British, French, and Israeli attack on Egypt. The Israeli army had swept through the Gaza Strip and killed many innocent Palestinians. Arafat and a few of his Palestinian friends joined the Egyptian army and fought in defense of Gaza and Port Said.

He and his friends from Gaza, Khalil Al-Wazir, Hamid Abu Sitta, and Jamal Al-Sourani, were very bitter as a result of the Israeli massacre of Palestinians in the villages of Rafah, Khan Younis, and others during the war. They came to see the Egyptian army as unable to defend their towns and villages, and decided to take responsibility for their own defense. They secretly organized to fight the Israeli army.

Thus began the secretive years of organizing the Palestinian Resistance Movement, later known as Al-Fatah, from 1956 until 1967. It was in these secretive years that Arafat emerged as a leader and an organizer of his people. During his years at the University of Cairo he used his contacts through the Union of Palestinian Students to organize small groups for active Palestinian work.

In the Spring of 1956, Arafat led the first Palestinian delegation to an international conference in Prague, Czechoslovakia, with Salah Khalaf and Suhair Al-Alami. There, he made contact with Palestinian students in Europe. He continued these contacts after his graduation from Cairo and his work as an engineer in Kuwait. Arafat worked with a group of young Palestinians that included Khaled Al-Hassan, Adel Abdul Karim and Abdallah Al-Dannan, and published *Falastinnuna* (Our Palestine) which advocated grass-roots and national organizing and conducting armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine.

In the early 1950s, Arafat also had made contacts with leaders of the underground Algerian Resistance Movement. Thus by 1960, as Algeria became independent and President Ahmad Ben Bella assumed power, Arafat and Al-Wazir turned their attention to the new nation for help.

The first Fatah office was opened in Algeria in 1961 under the name "Bureau de la Palestine" headed by Al-Wazir. Arafat continued to travel and work secretly in other Arab states including Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. He was arrested and jailed in Syria and later in Lebanon in 1966. These were difficult times for Arafat. He lacked the funds to travel and to organize and was continuously harassed by police officials.

Arafat argued, among his colleagues, of the need to launch an armed struggle against Israel, even though he knew that most Arab governments opposed such action. But whatever criticism could be levelled at such an approach, this historic decision meant that Palestinians were taking their destiny into their own hands; they were going to depend on themselves for regaining their rights and their freedom.

Al-Fatah conducted its first military operation on January 1, 1965. The operation ushered in a new era of Palestinian history and witnessed the reemergence of the Palestinian struggle under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. Out of the despair of refugees, Arafat was able to forge a new Palestinian resistance movement that would soon have an explosive impact on the region and the world.

Arafat knew in 1965 that a long and hard struggle would lie ahead. He said of that period—

> We had a slogan from the beginning: It is not a picnic. It is a long, hard struggle. The Vietnamese took 35 years of continuous war. The Algerians, 150, the Rhodesians about 100, the Saudis, 500. But from the beginning we

believed that sooner or later, we would achieve our goals, because we were with the tide of history, while Israel is against it.

photo by Murad Abed Al-Raouf

President Arafat inspecting a military position in Tripoli, Lebanon. On his right is a unit commander and Abu Jihad, his deputy commander who was slain last year.

The Military Leader and Political Organizer (1967-1984)

Yasser Arafat emerged as the public leader of the Palestinians after the devastating 1967 Arab-Israeli war. With the defeat of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, Arafat used his small Palestinian organization to lead the struggle against the Israeli military occupation. In 1967, he secretly spent months in the occupied West Bank organizing Palestinian resistance. And in 1968, he led the battle of Karameh, in Jordan, where a small group of guerrillas defeated the Israeli army. Thus by 1969, Arafat emerged as the leader of the Palestinian resistance movement and was nominated by his supporters to lead the PLO.

The next 10 years were difficult, as he had to fight to survive in Jordan and Lebanon, where both governments opposed the presence of Palestinian guerrillas on their soil. The new Syrian government, led by Hafez Al-Assad, opposed Arafat and continued to support his opponents in Lebanon. In 1975, the Syrian army entered Lebanon to control the Palestinian forces led by Arafat. A number of refugee camps were destroyed, the most important of which was Tal-Al-Zaatar where over 30,000 Palestinians were killed.

Critics of Arafat argue that his leadership led to these defeats and massacres. But in fact Arafat's strategy was always to try to avoid these confrontations in either Jordan or Lebanon. He concluded a number of agreements with these governments to ensure the safety of his forces as well as that of the refugee camps. He continued to negotiate with the Syrian government to avoid clashes. But Al-Assad was determined to dominate the Palestinian revolution and to prevent it from spreading to other Arab countries. The Jordanian and Syrian governments' inability to control the PLO eventually gave Israel an excuse and the means to invade Lebanon to destroy the PLO's military and political presence. In 1978 and again in 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon intending to destroy the PLO and to wipe out its leadership, including Arafat and his followers.

The 1982 Israeli siege of West Beirut was a test to Arafat's leadership. He was able to rally the Palestinian and Lebanese people in a heroic three-month defense of the city. Israel used all kinds of massive fire power, including attempts to kill Arafat through continuous air raids, to force the PLO to surrender. Arafat, with increasing international and Arab popular support, was able to withstand the siege and to emerge from Beirut a stronger leader.

The Syrian government moved to limit Arafat's power in northern Lebanon and expelled him and his forces from Tripoli after bloody battles in 1983. Western and Israeli analysts argued then that the PLO and Arafat were finished. The U.S. government turned its attention to Jordan to find a solution to the Palestinian problem, and in Lebanon it attempted to impose a Lebanese-Israeli treaty patterned on the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel. Arafat in the meantime was quickly reorganizing his military forces and political offices in an attempt to regain the initiative.

The International Years (1984-1989)

Arafat's ability to survive these attacks assured his international role in the 1980s. He had built a PLO infrastructure, economic, social, and political, that was indestructible. He was able to rebuild his power in the refugee camps in Lebanon. In the occupied West Bank and Gaza, he was able also to rebuild his political base. This became the foundation for the present-day Palestinian Uprising which again reaffirmed Arafat and the PLO leadership. Arafat's

assistant, Khalil Al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), emerged as the organizer of the Uprising, which led to the Israeli government's decision to assassinate him in April 1988.

Arafat's regained strength in Lebanon, renewed support from most of the Arab states including Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and of course his unequivocal support in the Uprising enabled him to begin a new political initiative against Israel. Arafat used United Nations resolutions adopted since 1974, which express increasing support for the Palestinians as a means to politically isolate the Israeli and U.S. governments.

He also worked on diplomatic initiatives in Africa, Asia, and Europe to give him increasing political support at the United Nations. When the U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz denied Arafat a visa to travel to New York to address the U.N. General Assembly in December 1988, all U.N. member states, except Israel, condemned the United States and voted to move the General Assembly to Geneva to hear Arafat speak. The U.S. defeat at the United Nations assured a new era in Arafat's leadership.

Arafat effectively used the Uprising to further isolate Israel in the United States and Europe. His dialogue with leading Jewish Americans further strengthened his political position. His proposals to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict based on United Nations resolutions and the decision of the PLO to establish a Palestinian state gave Arafat added political strength in the Arab World, Europe, and the United States.

After 25 years of struggle, Arafat was able to gain international recognition for the political rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination and the legitimacy of Palestinian national independence.

Of all the Arab states, only Syria remains opposed to his declaration of a Palestinian state. Of course, the Israeli government viewed it as a threat to its security and vowed never to allow it to emerge. Will Arafat be able, in the next few years, to achieve this political goal? The answer will give another indication as to Arafat's effectiveness as a leader.

Personality and Character

As any successful democratic leader, Yasser Arafat depends on his personality and character for his success. Compared with other modern Arab leaders, Arafat stands out. Most of his associates and observers describe him as a simple and humble man, sensitive to the needs of all the people. He never turns anyone away. His offices are always open to thousands of visitors, from important leaders to ordinary citizens. He is the most accessible leader in the Middle East.

One of the best descriptions of Arafat's character appears in Dr. Rashida Mahran's study, *Yasser Arafat: The Difficult Number*. Dr. Mahran discusses his life and concludes that he is "a believer, a brave, daring decisionmaker, an affectionate and forgiving man."

In *Guerrillas for Palestine*, Al-Rayyes writes that Arafat is—

> a Muslim who abstains totally from smoking and drinking. Arafat is unmarried and apparently totally dedicated to the cause of Palestine and little else. "Palestine is my wife," he is reported as saying. His character is supposed to be quiet and self effacing.

This quality of total dedication to his work is what made him a respected leader of a most difficult cause.

Even his enemies and those who constantly oppose his policies, such as George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), grant that Arafat is unquestionably sincere in his work. Says Habash—

> [R]eally, we feel he is so passionate, so caring and so faithful. On our side, we have many political differences with him . . . but as a human being how can we not love him? He is a man of cause and thus a leader who will never allow the PLO to become the puppet of any Arab regime.

President Arafat with King Juan Carlos I of Spain. photo by Murad Abed Al-Raouf

Arafat has an amazing ability to forgive his harshest opponents in the PLO and to readmit them. Between 1983 and 1986, during the height of the split within the PLO, he continued to send salaries to those in Damascus who led the opposition. His strategy is always one of compromise, finding middle-of-the-road solutions and common denominators between the heterogeneous parties within the PLO.

He is thus able to bring the extreme left groups and the extreme right groups together and have them agree on a common political platform. He calls this the PLO's "law of love." He strongly believes in dialogue and abhors any resort to violence to silence the opposition. Arafat has, in fact, protected the smaller Palestinian groups such as the PFLP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and given them political and financial support.

He is neither a dictator nor a violent ruler despite the great power and authority he wields. He seeks consensus within the PLO and spends long hours meeting with different PLO factions. He has to accept the decisions of the Palestine National Council and the PLO Central Committee, his own Executive Committee and the Fatah Central Committee. He cannot, like some other leaders, dismiss such councils and committees.

On a number of occasions these committees have issued statements critical of his decisions, such as his 1983 visit to Egypt. But he always meets and consults with these political bodies to explain and defend his policies. He knows the value of consulting with even those who disagree with him. He seeks their advice and opinion. He also seeks factual information from different sources to be able to reach his decisions.

Another of his most outstanding qualities is his courage and ability to face the most dangerous situations with a clear mind. The best examples of this were visible in his role during the civil war in Amman, Jordan, in September 1970, and his role during the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. Arafat fought alongside regular militiamen, leading the battles. In 1978, he personally lead fighters in the defense of the Lebanese city of Tyre. During the siege of West Beirut in the summer of 1982, he visited frontlines and oversaw the defense of the city for three and a half months.

In his book, ***Beirut Earthquake***, Abu Tayeb describes how Arafat lived in his car at night, how he visited front lines, and how the Israeli air force tried to kill him by bombing a number of civilian buildings where they thought Arafat was residing or working.

Arafat's ability to survive has become a legend in Palestinian folklore. Palestinians sing of a battle between Arafat and death and how Arafat wins over death. Some writers argue that Arafat's deep faith in his fate and his religion gives him this great inner strength. During the worst days of the siege of Beirut, Arafat made his famous slogan imploring his followers not to be afraid. He told them, "I smell the winds of heaven blowing."

Conclusion

Power has not corrupted Yasser Arafat. He has seen untold wealth and massive support, not only in the Arab states, but all over the world. Millions of people in Syria, Iran, India, and Africa have rallied to hear him and see him. Many view him as a "saint with a holy cause." Yet he continues, at age 59, to live a very simple life. He personally has no money, car, or home. He eats very little and fasts for a whole month despite all the pressures with which he must deal.

His greatest love and joy is Palestinian children. Every month he spends hours with the children of martyrs. He says they give him hope and faith in the future. To him they are pure and simple. He relates to them because within him there is that pure and innocent youthful quality. Part of it stems from his religious beliefs in goodness and justice.

*See **YASSER ARAFAT**, Page 39*

photo by Murad Abed Al-Raouf

President Arafat with Bishop Elia Khoury, a member of the PLO Executive Committee.

From Sabra and Shatilla to Gaza

The Story of Doctor Swee Chai Ang's Life-Saving Mission

Claudia Kravets

Motivated by Christian belief, and her oath as a physician, Dr. Swee Chai Ang responded to an appeal from the Middle East Council of Churches for British doctors to treat the injured in Palestinian communities outside Beirut in 1982. The foreign doctors filled in for the more than 150 Palestinian doctors who had been captured in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Ang worked under the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), a Red Cross affiliate, pledged to treat all persons in need, whether Palestinian, Lebanese, Israeli, or other.

Ang arrived at the end of August. A cease-fire had been reached in which the PLO would evacuate by sea while a security force of U.S., French, Italian, and British personnel guaranteed the safety of civilians left behind. Hastily scrawled "I love you" posters hung all over Beirut expressing the parting sentiments of 12,000 young men born in Beirut to the Palestinian refugees of 1948. Most of them would never see their homes again. "I realized they were leaving behind their families, their children, their sisters, mothers, girlfriends, and wives," Ang recalled. "That was my first understanding of what the Palestinian family is about. The evacuation of 1982 was an instantaneous deportation of 12,000 male Palestinians."

The little boy had been in a group of little boys hit by hand grenades. He came in alive, and we operated on him, but there was only one packet of blood left. At the mother's direction, the blood was given to the child, and the mother died.

People came out of bomb shelters. Old men, women, and children returned to blocks of homes, shops, factories, and kindergartens of Sabra and Shatilla on the southern outskirts of Beirut. Floors were swept clean, curtains hung in windows, and flowers were placed at doorsteps of the homes that the Palestinians in exile had built. "Each day I heard the laughter of children returning," Ang smiled.

In spite of their protected status under the Red Cross, nine hospitals and 13 clinics operated by the PRCS had been destroyed during 10 weeks of constant Israeli bombardment. Gaza Hospital alone remained, saved by the fact that three Israelis were being treated on its sixth floor ward.

Gaza Hospital stood in Sabra, a community of struggling rural

Claudia Kravets, a resident of Reston, Virginia, currently works in Amman, Jordan.

Lebanese migrants to Beirut, and those Palestinian families whose good fortune had purchased them a residence just outside the neighboring refugee village, Shatilla. Together the parallel communities of mostly one- and two-story buildings covered an area of just a half square kilometer, about the width of the Smithsonian Mall in Washington.

Gaza Hospital's ambulances crossed the security check point into Shatilla daily to meet the needs of not only the wounded but of those whose health was suffering from extended inaccessibility to medical supplies.

Ang began operating on wounds as old as 10 weeks, some infected. The work was difficult. The invading Israeli army cut off electric power, and, until the generator could be repaired, patients needing respiration had to be hand ventilated. Blood donors had to be found just before patients needed transfusions because there was no way to store blood. On one occasion, Dr. Ang had to persuade the Italian officer in charge of nearby troops to send two men with A+ blood to save the life of a nine year-old boy who had contracted typhoid because there was no drinking water.

Children crippled forever by fragmentation bombs and phosphorus filled the orthopedic ward. Even so, daily routines assumed a semblance of normalcy and a feeling of hope for the future prevailed. The multinational force withdrew.

On September 15, one day after the assassination in Beirut of Israel's protégé, Lebanese president-elect, Bashir Gemayel, Israeli planes flew in and tanks surrounded the two communities. "We were shelled, and black smoke appeared," recalled Ang. "People came running in [to the hospital] saying the tanks were chasing them into the middle of the camps." All night flares lit the

Palestinian child in front of her demolished home in Shatilla refugee camp.

photo by Said Elatab/Middle East Photo

sky, and machine guns chattered.

> Next morning the casualties worsened. There were women shot in the elbow, the jaw, the brain, the abdomen, the chest. Many of them died before we could get to them.
>
> We sent ambulances to evacuate the wounded, but many that went never returned. We operated, and operated, on strings of patients. Some died before they were brought into the operating room. Some were alive. We soon ran out of anesthetic. We ran out of blood.

The shooting continued." Again flares blazed in the sky all night.

"The mortuary filled with bodies," Ang continued. "We had to put them on top of each other." Photos of old men and infants, dead and still wet with blood, underscore her point. "I remember very clearly operating on a mother and son. She was shot in the abdomen. The little boy had been in a group of little boys hit by hand grenades. He came in alive, and we operated on him, but there was only one packet of blood left." At the mother's direction, the blood was given to the child, and the mother died.

By morning of the third day, all the PRCS nurses and doctors had vanished, having either been picked up or having gone into hiding. Soldiers ordered the 22 foreign medical workers out of the hospital and marched them at gunpoint down the main road out of Sabra. The morning light revealed the ruins and the rubble. "When I came out for the first time, and looked and saw the dead bodies in the narrow streets, I knew that while we were operating in the basement of Gaza Hospital, trying to save a handful of lives," Ang winced, "people were dying by the thousands."

"As we passed, we could see groups of women and children rounded up with soldiers [threatening close by]. From the look on their faces, the terror in their eyes, I knew what was about to happen. A desperate woman tried to give me her baby. I held him a second in my arms before he was snatched away. For days after that, though I roamed the length and breadth of Sabra and Shatilla, I never found the mother and son."

The soldiers took the group to the multi-storied United Nations building, one of several with a commanding view overlooking Sabra and Shatilla. "They put us through a mock execution, and interrogated us. They told us they were Lebanese Christians, but the newspapers they read were Hebrew, and the food they ate came from Israel," Ang observed. "I was too angry to be frightened. I was furious."

"It was a bad time." The paint was still fresh on walls hung with the photographs of families just murdered. Only three days after the

Courtesy of Claudia Kravets

About Dr. Swee Chai Ang and Her New Assignment: Al-Ahli Hospital, Gaza

"Competing for a surgical career in Britain requires following a set path," according to Dr. Swee Chai Ang. "Getting board exams as soon as possible—young—beating the boys at it, passing all the exams the first time, going in the right jobs. And you do not resign." Ang had followed the formula until 1982, "to resign then and to work out there when the Palestinians were not a very popular cause."

And to actively campaign in public and make it known that you stand with the Palestinians and you are angered by the injustice done to them, didn't help at all. It was stacking up another prejudice—one she's small, two she's colored, three she's a woman, and four she's pro-Palestinian." Hearty laughter ripples through every inch of her four foot seven inch frame. "Oh my God, you know. It was all the wrong credentials. . . . "To be a woman orthopedic surgeon is difficult. The prejudice is enormous. I suppose that's why I reacted the way I did when I found out the horrible things that were being done to the Palestinians. When you find someone else who's been done a wrong, you feel much more strongly."

Ang says, "the kind of injuries I expect to see are those caused by blunt trauma: clubbing. These are basically fractures, testes injuries, blunt abdominal injuries, head injuries like depressed fracture of the skull, and injuries due to ammunition: rubber bullets, live bullets, dumdum bullets and so on. In fact this morning, I was shown a modified rubber bullet that's got lead inside and that works like ordinary shrapnel. It goes in and it explodes so it can fracture the leg," she explained. Ang is well qualified for the UNRWA assignment in Gaza's Al-Ahli Hospital. She has delivered medical aid under war conditions before.

Tonight, on the eve of her departure, the diminutive woman strides briskly across the lobby of the Jerusalem Hotel in Amman, Jordan. As always, she is wearing sensible pumps with thick mid-high heels—the same style she wore in her photos six years ago in Sabra, three years ago in Shatilla, and last year in Burj Al Barajneh. This is a woman who knows where she is going. Dr. Swee Chai Ang is going to work in Al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza.

Ang reflects on the meaning of her work with the Palestinians. "I am sure the experience of working with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories will be very rewarding and enriching for me. Because I, for one, have found that I have met people who have brought out the best in humanity under very difficult circumstances. I feel that it is not enough to have a comfortable life and a career. After all, what is being a doctor about? If you can put your skills to helping people that deserve help, that fight for their own rights and stand up: that, I think, is an honor that all doctors should want." □

massacre, survivors returned to Sabra and Shatilla. Many of them would face the cold and wet Lebanese winter without a roof over their heads.

"Children followed me everywhere," Ang remembers. "They were the most courageous children I have ever seen. We [in the medical team] drew courage from the Palestinian people. They inspired us in our depths of despair. After the massacre of 1982, when I was walking through the mass graves, when the stench of dead bodies filled the camps, when women howled and screamed when they identified a body—many times so decomposed that identification was made from a bracelet or a dress—it was the children who taught me the meaning of life." The children in the pictures beam at the camera, unafraid.

Feeling that medical skills alone were not enough, Ang resolved to do something for those that she could not save or help. She testified in Tel Aviv before the Kahan Commission. The Kahan Commission was formed in response to an international and internal Israeli outcry and charged with investigating what had happened in Beirut. The commission found that Ariel Sharon, the minister of defense, bore personal responsibility and recommended that Prime Minister Menachem Begin remove him from office. Sharon has since purchased a home in Arab East Jerusalem and, now in his 50s, is the second highest ranking Likud party member in the Israeli Knesset.

Returning to her practice in England, Ang and a group of friends formed a new charity, Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP).* In 1984, it started sending money for medical equipment and medicines to wherever Palestinian people might be in need. "Sending milk to kids is not political," asserts Ang. "Building

a clinic so the wounded can be treated is also not political. Helping to educate doctors and nurses so that they can continue to treat patients in our absence is not political." At the time Palestinians were not a very popular cause in Britain, nor was Ang's career following a time-honored path.

Back in Lebanon, the Palestinian communities were struggling to repair and rebuild. Some of the men had filtered back to rejoin whatever family survived.

Then, in May 1985, the Palestinian communities were attacked by Lebanese Amal militia. Well defended this time, the communities held out for 40 days. Fifty young men and women died protecting the communities. "MAP received an SOS," Ang remembers. "We learned that the militia had burned Gaza Hospital and shot doctors and nurses."

MAP immediately sent its first medical team into the field. Ang took annual leave to lead the effort personally. The MAP team and the PRCS agreed that clinics and hospitals would have to be located inside refugee villages so that, in case of a siege, people could be treated inside the villages instead of being brought out and killed at the check points. A nursing home inside Shatilla was selected for conversion into Haifa Hospital. The Palestinians worked fast knocking down walls, bringing in oxygen tanks, preparing dressings, and painting.

Ang started in a temporary orthopedic clinic, operating by torch light for six weeks without mask or gloves, on patients who were not anesthetized. Returning to Durham Hospital in England following the six weeks in Shatilla, Ang marveled, "I couldn't believe that I could switch on the lights and there was light, and there was water and anesthetic, and patients were well looked after, and the wards had clean sheets and the nurses were not harassed. What I do in Lebanon is real tough surgery. What I do in Britain is rehabilitative for my own traumatized soul."

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A child wounded during an Israeli air raid on a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon.

photo by Said Elatab/Middle East Photo

Attitudes in Britain were changing. A great deal of sympathy had grown for Palestinian suffering. MAP was flooded with people wanting to know how they could help. Medical volunteers came forward. MAP sent fresh teams of medical personnel to Haifa Hospital: anesthetists, midwives, physiotherapists, nurses, general practitioners, and public health workers. One surgeon, Dr. Pauline Cutting, went with the third team in November 1985. Cutting worked in Haifa Hospital for the next 18 months. During that time the communities came under a 163-day siege. Nothing went in or went out.

In January 1987, Ang received a message that the people in Sabra and Shatilla were starving. "Pauline told me she had run out of medicine. There were wounded people. The children had no milk. Women were being shot trying to go for water." In response to this message, many volunteers came forward, and a team of seven, including Ang, flew to Beirut. There she negotiated with the Syrians the safe conduct of the MAP team out of Lebanon, and she and the fresh team went into Shatilla to relieve them. Many believe that the presence of the British team, and the attendant publicity saved the community from starvation. Cutting recounted her experiences in her book, *Children of the Siege*.

Medical volunteers from all over the world came to lend a hand. They came to help 30,000 people who had lost their homes in Sabra and Shatilla and who, in that "International Year of Shelter for the Homeless," huddled in stairwells and crowded into under-

Victims of the Sabra and Shatilla massacres of September 1982. photo by Said Elatab/Middle East Photo

ground parking garages. The medical needs continue to be staggering. UNRWA, the PRCS, MAP, and other international agencies cooperate to alleviate respiratory diseases caused by dampness and overcrowding.

The bombardment in Lebanon destroyed 20,000 homes. The evacuation split families. The massacre wiped out generations. The 100 families that remained in Shatilla at the end of 1987 were driven out by fresh attacks. Today, the ruins of Shatilla stand empty. Many Palestinian exiles relocated to southern Lebanon near the port of Sidon where they continue to live under frequent siege. Official figures report 108 people killed and 194 wounded in Israeli air strikes during 1988.

Until recently, MAP sent only medicine and funds for medical supplies to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A recent request for assistance from medical personnel indicates that the situation there is becoming more difficult. Palestinian sources attribute over 400 miscarriages in the second and third trimester of pregnancy to tear gas. UNRWA has confirmed 305 Palestinian fatalities in the Uprising during the first 11 months of 1988.

The Gaza Strip, an area some 27 miles long and 5.5 miles wide, is home to about 650,000 Palestinians. Casualties—that is the wounded persons who sought medical treatment at one of UNRWA's nine health centers in the Gaza Strip—numbered over 11,000 as of November 10, 1988. According to an UNRWA spokesperson, this number does not include additional casualties who were either treated at home or treated at one of Gaza's three hospitals. Many of these casualties have been permanently disabled due to the loss of an eye, loss of the use of a limb, and the complications of other severe injuries. UNRWA workers recently treated a 12-year-old who suffered 15 bullet wounds. □

*Donors and volunteers may contact Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP), registered charity 263670, at 29A Enford Street, London, England W1H 1DG.

Who Will Support Shamir in the Hour of Truth?

Pinhas 'Anbari

For a long time now, the extreme right-wing Israeli settler group, *Gush Emunim* or "Bloc of the Faithful," refrained from illegally establishing new settlements and other such activities. However in mid-March, they declared a new settlement near the West Bank Palestinian city of Ramallah—and as in the past, they did not ask the "permission" of the Israeli government, let alone the permission of the Palestinian people.

On the face of it, there is nothing particularly unusual about this latest move. It is completely compatible with *Gush Emunim*'s ideology and practice. In fact, the very methods used in March have distinguished and defined *Gush Emunim* from its very beginning. Starting from 1974 until the fall of Yitzhak Rabin's Labor government in 1977, *Gush Emunim* illegally established settlements and forced its outlook and agenda on Israeli society.

What are *Gush Emunim*'s out look and agenda? *Gush Emunim* is at root a religious group which believes that the redemption of the Jewish people cannot be achieved without the redemption of the biblical land of Israel or *Eretz Israel*. But more than that, they believe that the degree of the nation's redemption is directly related to the amount of *Eretz Israel* claimed by the modern state of Israel. Only when Israel fully controls the greater "land of Israel" will true salvation occur.

Although *Gush Emunim* ideology has not changed, the practical effects of forcefully establishing a settlement have. The Ramallah settlement is exposing a sharp split inside the Israeli Right itself. Thus, it not only points out the important changes which have occurred inside *Gush Emunim*, but also the changes in the Israeli Right as a



Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Drawing by Emile Sima'an

Pinhas 'Anbari is a journalist who writes for the Israeli newspaper Al-Hamishmar.

whole, especially within the Likud.

As in the past, the illegal settlement near Ramallah was not aimed at challenging the Israeli Left, which is calling for withdrawal from occupied Palestinian lands in exchange for peace. It is aimed at the Israeli Right.

One *Gush Emunim* leader, Eliaquim Haezni from the settlement of Qiryat Arba, near Hebron, openly attacked *Gush Emunim* spokesman Yisrael Harel because he admitted in a television debate with an Israeli leftist, that once an Israeli government decides to withdraw from the West Bank, he personally will obey. Haezni charged him with delivering unauthorized statements, and went as far as pinning the whole decision to establish the new settlement on Harel's statement.

This disagreement highlights *Gush Emunim*'s most dangerous implications, not only to Israeli society, but to the Jewish faith as well. Inexorably linking the fate of the Israeli nation to the concept of a "Greater Israel," and explaining it in religious terms is radically different from the approach of the secular elements in Israeli society. It threatens to be the root of an Israeli civil war on the one hand, and a religious schism inside the Jewish faith, on the other. The famous issue of "Who is a Jew" is only one side of this schism.

Not everybody in Likud and *Gush Emunim* is ready to take the responsibility for such dangerous consequences to this extreme religious philosophy.

In the beginning, very few of Israel's more secular right-wing supporters were aware of the dangers inherent in *Gush Emunim*'s ideology. But in the course of time, the Likud preferred coalition governments with the left-leaning Labor party, rather than with its natural allies, the right-wing religious parties which sympathize with *Gush Emunim*.

In the course of time, the Likud preferred coalition governments with the left-leaning Labor party, rather than with its natural allies, the right-wing religious parties which sympathize with Gush Emunim.

Nobody can envy Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who has just visited Washington. His decision to create a government with the Israeli Left after the last election was a clear indication of his desire to prevent a civil war between the Israeli people over the future of the Israeli-occupied territories. Also *Gush Emunim* spokesman Yisrael Harel had the same thing in mind, as he called on the "Peace Now" movement, which is the major factor mobilizing peace forces in the Israeli Left, to agree to a national accord "before they go to talk with the PLO." It was this call by Harel which provoked his fellow *Gush Emunim* member, Eliaquim Haezni's rage. Haezni is not ready to sit down with Peace Now, since they have crossed "the red line," as he maintains. And he now perceives his own movement's spokesman as someone who is crossing "the red line."

Lately, Shamir has furiously assaulted the Peace Now movement to make it clear that he is not going to change loyalties. The leader of the Likud does not intend to ask Peace Now to help him confront *Gush Emunim*, which is still his ally among the Israeli right-wing religious parties—at least for the time being.

The hour of truth is approaching. And Shamir must remember that in the previous hour of truth, when his predecessor, Menachem Begin, decided to evacuate the Sinai Peninsula, he painfully encountered the same *Gush Emunim*. Shamir must remember that only 10 years ago, during that confrontation, he empathized with *Gush Emunim*; and that Likud leader Menachem Begin reached out for assistance to the Labor party and . . . Peace Now. □

Journalists Take Note

John Law

TIME THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

It is about time that American journalists covering Middle East affairs for the major media got a better grip on their perspectives. Many have been writing as though there were no yesterday, and treating every new development—sometimes even a minor one—as though it were either a sensational breakthrough or a major setback.

For instance, what are we to make of *Washington Post* correspondent Glenn Frankel's report from Jerusalem during February, when he referred to Yitzhak Shamir as the "*formerly* hard-line" prime minister? (These, and all other italics that follow, are mine.) This anointment of Shamir as a born-again peacemaker stemmed from his statement that he might under certain conditions be prepared to remove Israeli troops from some of the major population centers in the West Bank and Gaza—while retaining the troops elsewhere in the territories, of course, for use when needed. Big deal. Now all we have to do is wait for the supposedly dovish premier to abandon a couple of other minor hangups—like his refusal to talk with the PLO and his insistence that Israel will not relinquish "one square inch" of occupied Palestine.

This inducement to false optimism among *The Washington Post*'s readers was essentially harmless, since they are sure to find out sooner or later that the paper jumped the gun—to say the least. But other recent interpretations of Middle East developments by "mainstream" journalists are more serious because they have tended to falsify history—in a way that could damage the prospects for PLO success in working out a peaceful solution to the conflict with Israel.

The main culprits are to be found among those who covered the Palestine National Council's decision last November to recognize Israel and accept a "two-state" solution. With rare exceptions, writers from the major media oohed and aahed at what they seemed to think was a sudden and dramatic about-face by a formerly "rejectionist" Yasser Arafat.

The fact that the PLO leadership, headed by Arafat, had been trying since 1974 to bring about a U.N.-guaranteed and internationally enforced diplomatic solution—one based on the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in return for Palestinian acceptance of Israel behind its 1967 borders—went unmentioned by almost all of the journalists. Apparently forgotten were even relatively recent events like Arafat's signing, on February 11, 1985, of an agreement with Jordan's King Hussein to enter into direct negotiations with Israel for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the Occupied Territories that would voluntarily enter into a confederation with Jordan.

Also forgotten was Arafat's approval of the "Fez Declaration," in September 1982, which effectively recognized Israel within its 1967 borders. In fact, it had been clear throughout this stretch of 14 years that Arafat, in his elected role as chairman of the movement, had the support of the

John Law is a former Middle East bureau chief for U.S. News and World Report *and the founder of the* Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. *He also serves on the editorial board of* The Return.

mainstream of the PNC for this kind of a two-state solution—provided that, for insurance purposes, he kept carrying a gun as well as an olive branch.

What gave Arafat's diplomatic offensive a historic impetus last November (under the stimulus of the *Intifadah*) was the PNC's decision to drop its requirement of unanimity in the voting process—allowing it to give official rather than only *de facto* backing for Arafat's policies. But you would never have guessed this from reading the major U.S. media.

An example of such distortion of the facts in U.S. newspapers can be found in the writings of *The New York Times*' John Kifner, a specialist in the Middle East who at that time came out with this lead on the morning (November 15) after the PNC voted its resolutions: "*Until last night*, the Palestine Liberation Organization had refused, throughout its 24 years of existence, to accept the existence of Israel."

Kifner's thesis was backed up by his colleague, Youssef Ibrahim, reporting on page one from the scene, who wrote that Arafat now "recognizes Israel, at least implicitly, *for the first time*." In an accompanying analytical article, he called it a significant move "away from the 'rejectionist' views that have so dominated the (Palestinian) movement in the past." *The Washington Post* chimed in on the same day with an editorial saying that "now *for the first time* reasonable people can ask if Palestinians are at least moving toward peace."

A week later, on November 23, the *Christian Science Monitor*'s John Hughes wondered: "Was it all double talk at Algiers? Or is there serious movement within the PLO to bring about by diplomacy what terrorism and violence have been unable to achieve?"

What are we to make of* Washington Post *correspondent Glenn Frankel's report from Jerusalem during February, when he referred to Yitzhak Shamir as the "formerly *hard-line*" prime minister?

After 14 years of frustrating struggle by Arafat and other members of the leadership to try to get the United States and Israel to listen to a proposal suggesting that the PLO will go so far as to abandon 81 percent of its homeland in order to gain a tiny independent state of its own—we are being asked by a prestigious journalist if the PLO is "finally" going to try the diplomatic route?

How about *Time* magazine? Even after it had more than a month to ponder the historical perspective of what had happened in Algiers, it said in its December 26 issue that it had a "glimpse" of a "PLO apparently ready to swap its strategy of intransigence for the bargaining table."

Columnists? Even one as generally sympathetic to the Palestinian position as William Raspberry of *The Washington Post* wrote a column that was 14 years late, when he described the current PLO policy this way: "Instead of talking about driving Jews into the sea, it is talking about a Palestinian homeland in the West Bank and Gaza."

Nor can the networks be excluded from this long list, which is in any case no more than the tip of the iceberg. Even ABC's Barry Dunsmore, who is normally as even-handed an analyst on this issue as the networks have, said on the air from Geneva after Arafat's "recognition" statement: "The irony is that when the PLO *finally* agrees to recognize Israel's right to exist, the Israelis are *no longer* interested in making a deal." This not only suggests that Arafat had held off until that very moment to abandon terrorism and take the diplomatic route, but also that Israel had actually been interested in providing Palestinians with an independent homeland in the West Bank and Gaza—neither of which is true.

Does it really matter what these journalists, and others, wrote or said? Yes. The problem that their myopic interpretations of events have caused is that they have made it much easier for Israeli officials and their supporters to sound credible to Americans when they argue, as they do, that the PLO's expressed willingness to make a deal with Israel is just skin deep. For so many Americans, who get the bulk of their information from a very quick scanning of the newspaper headlines and/or the news broadcasts, the Israeli argument sounds compelling—if it is true, as the American media itself is saying, that until only yesterday the PLO was focusing entirely on terrorism and the destruction of Israel, how can the Israelis really

MONITOR New York Times

trust the PLO's statements that it now, apparently overnight, recognizes Israel's right to exist?

One of the more potentially damaging counterattacks by Israeli propagandists has been to argue that the PLO is using salami tactics to take over all of Palestine, "one slice at a time." Once the PLO has the West Bank and Gaza, the Israelis say, it will then use force and terrorism to pressure Israel into giving up another peace of Israel, and then another, and another. To an American public fed for years by the media with stories about Palestinian terrorism and then told that the PLO has had an alleged "deathbed conversion," this scenario carries a ring of truth.

Yet it is a scenario that makes no sense whatsoever. Once the PLO has successfully negotiated—for better or for worse—an independent homeland limited to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it will be stuck with it. This is because any arrangement brokered by an international conference is virtually certain to include unprecedentedly rigorous superpower guarantees of the new borders, as well as demilitarized zones and other enforcement measures designed to prevent the launching of an attack upon Israel by the new, tiny state of Palestine. The real question would be whether the reverse could be prevented from happening.

The Israeli disinformation experts are fond of bringing up the continued existence of the Palestinian National Covenant as "proof" that the Palestinians will not be satisfied with a homeland restricted to the West Bank and Gaza and will resort to salami tactics to take over the rest by force. Here, too, in addition to the current denials by Palestinian leaders of any intention to do this—on the grounds that their statements of recognition and acceptance of a two-state solution are, in effect, "amendments" to the Covenant—there have also been previous PLO disclaimers during the years dating back to 1974, when Arafat decided to try the diplomatic route. However, I search in vain for any allusion to this fact in the news stories being written and spoken today.

The frustration level among Palestinians is much higher than it would be if they had only begun trying for a two-state solution last November.

Palestinians believed then, as they do now, that Zionism is an unacceptable, racist creed, and that the best solution for Palestine would be to have a single, secular state in which Jews, Christians, and Muslims could live together as equals, under one government. That is really what the PLO Covenant was all about. But in 1974, there were the Palestinian leaders making a decision to let the Israelis have their Zionist state, and to try by peaceful means to create an independent Palestinian state next to it.

To agree at that time to give up three-quarters of their homeland was an immense concession, but it got them nowhere. Instead of being regarded as sincere in wanting to make a settlement, they were called uncompromising terrorists by the Israelis, while various U.S. administrations nodded agreement.

Only after Palestinian frustration in occupied Palestine reached boiling point and turned into the *Intifadah* in December 1987, did the U.S. government begin taking the Palestinian demands more seriously—but as of this writing it has not taken them seriously enough to try to pressure Israel into making a deal. As for Israel's leaders, they are still, 14 years after the historic Palestinian offer, turning their noses up at it.

This is the history that American journalists should be aware of when they write about Palestinian political developments. The frustration level among Palestinians is much higher than it would be if they had only begun trying for a two-state solution last November. If the U.S. and Israeli governments continue for much longer to find fault with the idea of an independent Palestinian homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, more and more Palestinians will begin finding fault with the idea that they should limit themselves to a small state. They will begin thinking of the first option, rather than the second—since surrender to Israeli hegemony is no option at all.

When the *Intifadah* began, it was to show the Israelis that continued occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is unacceptable. This resistance to occupation is certain to continue until there is a negotiated political settlement—if there is

*See **JOURNALISTS**, Page 39*

Life Under Curfew

Judith Gabriel



An Israeli military helicopter hovers over a Jerusalem neighborhood during curfew. photo by Judith Gabriel

Unlike stone-throwing demonstrations, clashes with the military, and other widely photographed aspects of the *Intifadah*, what goes on during curfew is hidden from the eyes of the world. There are no cameras and no journalists in the "closed military area" of a curfew.

On almost any given day since the *Intifadah* or the Uprising began, at least one part or another of the Gaza Strip or the West Bank has been under curfew. During 1988, the first full year of the *Intifadah*, there were as many as 3,000 curfew days imposed, and that does not include the thousands of partial or night curfews.

Curfew is nothing new to life under occupation, but since the very beginning of the *Intifadah*, it has been part of the arsenal of countermeasures employed by Israel in its attempts to hold down the Uprising.

Palestinians see the tactic as a pervasive form of collective punishment. Indeed, the curfews of the *Intifadah* have frequently become mass sentences of oppression, according to human rights sources, citing numerous instances during which residents have been choked off from food and water, medical attention, and other vital links. More alarming, they say, is that under curfew villagers and refugees in the camps are prisoners in their own homes. As such, they are ready prey for savage attacks and harassment by Israeli troops.

During a curfew, troops reportedly patrol the narrow streets of the jumbled camps in military vehicles, tossing rocks or tear-gas canisters at houses, terrorizing the people inside. House raids are common, where family members of all ages are beaten indiscriminately, according to Palestinian medical sources.

Curfews frequently cause many tensions because of the "damned if you do—damned if you don't" situations they create. For instance, tear gas may be fired into a closed-up home. When the besieged residents open a door or window, to let the tear gas out, troops shoot at them.

Conditions vary as to whether or not residents will be able to get necessary medical treatment. The sick and injured may be prevented from getting to a hospital, and in the refugee camps, even if the clinics are open, residents may not be allowed to leave their homes. This can take a heavy toll on the chronically ill. Unfortunately, although international outcry has resulted in an easing of conditions in this regard, the mass deprivation of medical services still persists.

Often, those injured during curfew are denied medical aid and it is most likely that those injured, are injured by Israeli soldiers. During a one-hour break allowed in one curfew, more than 100 persons showed up at the camp clinic with injuries sustained in the previous night's raids.

Witnesses report that ambulances often are not allowed to move around a curfewed area. Soldiers have been seen shooting at ambulance tires. They have even shot at medical personnel trying to treat the wounded. More recently, however, United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) ambu-

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Judith Gabriel is a freelance journalist and photographer. She produces, Middle East in Focus, *a biweekly radio program in Los Angeles.*

lances have been allowed to enter curfew zones during medical emergencies. They have even been permitted to remove the patient. But there is no *carte blanche*.

There is one account of a woman taken by an ambulance to a maternity clinic to deliver her baby. When the ambulance tried to return her to her home the next day, the driver discovered that a curfew had been imposed overnight. Israeli soldiers at the refugee camp entrance refused to let the ambulance enter. The new mother, newborn baby in arms, was told to walk home.

There are several kinds of curfews, ranging in severity from lax to all-out military siege. During a strict curfew, refugee camp and village streets are empty—except for Israeli military personnel. No movement whatsoever is permitted, and even a glimpse of a person on the street or at an open window or door in a home—may result in a severe beating, sometimes of everyone in the home, as well as possible arrest and detention. At the very least, the "offenders" will have to pay steep fines.

During a relaxed curfew, residents caught on the street may be beaten and arrested as well—but if they can safely reach a home or shelter, they are not further pursued by troops. The problem is that curfew conditions can change from relaxed to strict with no warning. A family may have been sitting on a doorstep for hours, watching patrols drive by, only to be tear-gassed suddenly or shot at with live or rubber bullets during such a transition.

The nature of a curfew is largely determined by factors leading to its imposition in the first place. Often imposed as a punishment for alleged or actual acts of violence, or to expedite military searches for "wanted persons," curfews are frequently clamped on "hotspots," that is in places expected to trigger demonstrations, and during days designated for general strikes.

Israeli troops block entrance to the village of Silwan, adjacent to Jerusalem, during curfew in mid-January 1989.

During the convening of the Palestine National Council in Algiers, and again on the anniversary of the *Intifadah*, the entire Gaza Strip, and most of the West Bank, were either closed or placed under curfew. During the Israeli elections, all Gaza refugee camps were placed under curfew.

Curfews differ, also, in their duration. Naturally, the longer the curfew, the more devastating the impact. In November 1988, the village of Kufr Malik was placed under a 21-day curfew. Before long, sheep and other livestock were dying of starvation. The Israeli occupation forces refused to allow *any* supplies—even feed for the livestock—into the village. Electricity was also cut, and they refused to allow people to light candles at night.

The residents of Kufr Malik issued a statement to international organizations asking for intervention—

> to put an immediate end to the Israeli soldiers' barbaric treatment of the inhabitants of this peaceful village. . . .
>
> The only entrance to the village has been blocked by massive rocks, and the media has been banned from entering, so that our suffering, which is beyond description, cannot be recorded.

As time passes, conditions worsen, inside and outside the homes under curfew. When fuel supplies run out, residents resort to burning wood or pieces of furniture. In the refugee camps, sanitation workers are barred from entering, and garbage often accumulates in alleyways. Telephone lines are routinely cut during curfews, further insulating residents. In some camps, where there have been water shortages, residents fear the spread of disease. Children often suffer from dehydration.

Curfews severely disrupt work, business, and farming. Wrote Yehuda Litani in the *Jerusalem Post* on January 20, 1988—

> The extended curfews . . . are meant by the Israeli military authorities not only to contain the riots but also to exert economic pressure on the inhabitants. . . . While under curfew, the vast majority of

photo by Judith Gabriel

breadwinners cannot leave the camps to go to their jobs in Israel.

During a curfew, all of a person's activities must take place inside the shuttered confines of the homes affected. In one modest concrete-block dwelling in Gaza's Jabalya refugee camp the camp which virtually spawned the *Intifadah*—a father sits on the floor, surrounded by his eight children. He has grown increasingly accustomed to spending long hours in this position with his children under curfew. Jabalya was under curfew for nine months in the first 14 months of the *Intifadah*, he explains.

"I sit here with my eight children, hour after hour," says the man. His children range in age from 18 months to 16 years. "We try to keep the little ones quiet, but it's hard." He admits there are tense moments amid the cramping and forced confinement, but families have become very resilient and patient, he says.

As he speaks, his elderly mother sifts through a tray of *'adas*, the orange lentils that will be a mainstay during the next curfew. He points to the floor beneath the beds, replete with crates of tomatoes, plastic sacks of grapefruits, bags of potatoes. "In the early days, we weren't prepared for curfew. Now, we know better how to survive them." He and his family now live in constant preparedness for the next curfew. "Even on regular days, we never use anything unless we have more of it on hand."

When a curfew is declared suddenly, however, many are all too often caught unprepared, with no emergency rations on hand. Sometimes people are able to leave their homes for an hour or two a day to shop for food, but that may not be enough time to go to a neighboring village to shop. And even then, there can be problems getting the food back in. The *Jerusalem Post* reported one incident in which soldiers destroyed food being brought back into a camp by seven women. "As the women wept and screamed, the troops trampled on bread and vegetables and threw a basket of food under the wheels of a passing car." Troops have also entered homes during curfew, reportedly stamping on food supplies, urinating on them, or dousing them with kerosene.

During severe food shortages, the Israeli occupation forces have frequently blocked any food from entering at all. Particularly during the early months of the Uprising, Israeli soldiers stopped several convoys of food supplies from entering curfewed camps. For example, in late April 1988, Jalazoun camp had been under curfew for more than a month. The 7,000 residents were suffering severe food shortages. Young children had gone without milk for more than a month, and one mother lamented that all she had to give her baby was a piece of bread. Nonetheless, Israeli soldiers blocked food supplies from entering the camp. They even barred an UNRWA food convoy for two days on the pretext that it had not been granted permission.

There have been other ways that the curfews have created severe shortages. Those affected by the curfew are not allowed to harvest or care for their crops, and in many cases, the crops perish. One of the most dramatic incidents of this kind took place during the curfew of Beit Sahour, a town near Bethlehem, where a curfew was imposed after a tax raid conflict in early July 1988. During the curfew, crops were left to rot in the gardens and fields, and poultry died of hunger and thirst. Townspeople caught trying to water their backyard gardens were shot at.

In particularly harsh curfews, such as one recently clamped on Nablus in the West Bank, the Israeli occupation forces refused to renew so-called "permits of movement" for residents working in contingency services, such as health professionals, the fire brigade, and the electric company.

The practice of imposing curfews spread to East Jerusalem as the *Intifadah* moved along. When the village of Silwan, next to the walled Old City of Jerusalem was placed under curfew in January 1989, it was only the third time since the occupation began that parts of the city of Jerusalem itself were placed under curfew.

Although relatively brief, Silwan residents complained the curfew was a brutal siege. Teams of police and tax inspectors accompanied by border patrols and soldiers went house to house, searching every room, every closet, for alleged troublemakers. More than 30 people were arrested. In a two-hour sweep of the village, workers from the Israel Broadcast Authority impounded about 30 television sets

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ISRAEL'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Israel's Corner on the Mideast Nuclear Market

Jane Hunter

photo courtesy of U.S. Air Force

West German participation in the construction of a chemical plant in Libya is hardly the unprecedented calamity that U.S. officials have suggested. It is simply the latest instance in a pattern of permissiveness. For years now, industrialized countries have allowed uranium, plutonium, and other components of nuclear weapons to reach the developing world.

Israel has been one of the main beneficiaries of the lax control of nuclear materials. It has constructed the world's sixth largest nuclear arsenal out of bits and pieces acquired from several countries. And, in some cases, it has moved to deny rivals access to the same sources. It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that only now, when largely as a response to Israel's nuclear arsenal, Libya, Iraq, and Syria are reportedly seeking the means to produce chemical weapons, the spotlight has been trained on the flow of lethal goods from the developed to the developing world.

Jane Hunter is editor of the monthly publication Israeli Foreign Affairs.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 established rules governing the export of items related to nuclear weapons and nuclear technology. In exchange for the help of countries which have developed nuclear programs, those countries still developing nuclear programs—of which 137 have signed the NPT pledge never to try to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. And those nations which do possess nuclear weapons or weapons technology pledge to put all their nuclear exports under the control of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA monitors the use of nuclear materials to ensure that the material from the generation of nuclear power is not diverted to military use.

However, the protocols of the NPT often have not been able to match the determination of a handful of aspiring nuclear states to obtain technology and materials. Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa have all secured what is needed to develop nuclear weapons. In addition, experts agree that both Brazil and Argentina are on the verge of building nuclear weapons. Iran, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea also are frequently named as countries actively pursuing nuclear weapons. None of these countries has signed the NPT.

Early on, France helped Israel build the Dimona nuclear reactor, develop its nuclear program, and, eventually, make its own nuclear weapons. During the mid-1960s, Israel diverted more than 200 pounds of enriched uranium from an enrichment plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania, which the CIA believed was set up with secret Israeli backing. (For a more detailed examination of the Dimona reactor, the enriched uranium diverted from Pennsylvania, and the general development of Israel's nuclear program, see *The Return*, March 1989, p. 34.)

In 1968, in what came to be known as the Plumbat Affair, Israel arranged for the diversion at sea of 200 metric *tons* of uranium concentrate (an intermediate step in the enrichment process called "yellowcake") as it was being shipped from Belgium to Italy. In 1984, enriched uranium described

as "weak radioactive uranium" was shipped from Britain to Luxembourg—but ended up in Israel. Both the IAEA and Israel asserted that the material was unsuitable for making weapons.

To make nuclear weapons, a country needs either a supply of highly enriched uranium (the uranium isotope U-235 concentrated or "reprocessed") or plutonium. Reprocessing facilities, the facilities to enrich uranium, are extremely complex. Plutonium can be produced in a production reactor (such as Israel's installation at Dimona) or extracted, in a complex procedure from the spent uranium fuel rods of an electricity-generating reactor.

As nuclear reactors were built to power European nations, especially Britain, France, and West Germany, commercial reprocessing facilities were established, and enriched uranium, spent fuel rods, and plutonium became more available.

A 1987 British television documentary, *The Terror Trade: Buying the Bomb*, presented evidence that a group of nuclear industry workers, arms dealers, and assorted go-betweens is running an underground supply of nuclear materials, especially plutonium, to buyers who under the NPT could not legally obtain them.

Israel organized this black market a number of years ago to obtain plutonium and other materials for its nuclear weapons program, according to "Eric," the main informant for *The Terror Trade*. When Israel was able to manufacture enough plutonium for its own needs, he said, it still kept control of the market, so as "not to let anyone else get their hands on it."

"Eric" is the pseudonym of a Belgian arms dealer wanted in several countries for illegal arms sales. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency confirmed the truth of his statement. He had apparently helped U.S. authorities convict a major Mafia figure. Eric's contention that nuclear materials were going from European installations to the black market was backed by former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, who said in an interview on *The Terror Trade*, "I think there's been a black market in fissionable material and pieces of technology." Turner identified plutonium and enriched uranium siphoned from power reactors and enrichment processers as the commodities that pass through that market.

IAEA officials almost always deny that nuclear material escapes from their scrutiny, claiming that discrepancies indicating losses are merely material that was "caught in the pipes." However, a former IAEA inspector said on *The Terror Trade* that the agency is helpless to control the illegal disappearance of nuclear material. According to the documentary, 10 kilograms (22 pounds) of plutonium were missing from a British reprocessing plant in 1981. (Twenty pounds of plutonium are enough to bomb a city off the map. Nuclear scientists estimate that the sophisticated thermonuclear weapons Israel produces contain about 8.8 pounds of plutonium a piece.)

Unfortunately, the black market is only one source of nuclear materials for nonsigners of the NPT. Other material reaches them with the help of phony documentation, which might show a country that has signed the NPT as the legal buyer.

Alfred Hempel, a West German and a former Nazi officer, is known as a major broker of nuclear materials, offering "legal" documentation to his suppliers, which are known to include West Germany, Norway, China, and the Soviet Union. Through a network of West German, Swiss, and South African companies, Hempel has shunted his wares to Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Argentina.

Hempel has been a major dealer in heavy water produced by Norway. Technically known as

*See **NUCLEAR MARKET**, Page 28*

Israel's "Nonproliferation"

It is particularly ironic that while Washington covers Israel's development of nuclear weapons with a curtain of silent indulgence, Israel carries out its own version of nuclear nonproliferation, attempting to impede its enemies' nuclear development. In 1981, it bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor. And there are indications that Israel might have been involved in putting a hysterical spin on revelations in late 1987 that two West German firms had illegally exported radioactive nuclear waste material to Pakistan and Libya via Belgium. That the firms illegally transferred spent uranium to Belgium has been established, but the IAEA said it had found "no persuasive evidence" that unaccounted-for material was diverted to Libya or Pakistan.

A search for the source of information that the German material went on to Pakistan or Libya turned up nothing more substantial than a reported warning, given by Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin during a September 1987 visit to Bonn—and a report on West German television that Israel's secret service Mossad had planned to kidnap West German scientists it had identified as willing to work on Libyan or Pakistani nuclear projects. Mossad had to drop the plan when 10 forged British passports to be used for the operation were accidentally left in a Munich phone booth.□

In Brief

Israel's Space Program Update

After circling the earth for 118 days, on January 14 Israel's space satellite Ofeq-1 reentered the atmosphere and disintegrated. Although Israeli officials have denied it, the satellite is believed to be an instrument of military surveillance. Israeli officials said Ofeq's performance was perfect and that a second satellite, Ofeq-2 would be launched within the next 18 to 24 months.

Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir ordered a halt to the development of a communications satellite, the Amos, because of its price tag, $120 million over the next four years.

Kenya and the Central African Republic Reestablish Ties with Israel

Two African countries, Kenya and the Central African Republic, (CAR) which broke diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973, have renewed those ties. Both President Daniel T. arap Moi of Kenya and André Kolingba of the CAR used the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to exist as a pretext for their decisions.

However, the increasingly autocratic Moi is relying on Israel for intelligence, security, and some lobbying in Washington, and Kolingba reportedly has allowed his country to be used as one of several regional staging bases for a U.S.-Israeli operation to overthrow the government of Libya.

U.S. Embassy to Move to Jerusalem?

On January 19, U.S. President Ronald Reagan's last day in office, the United States signed an agreement on new diplomatic offices, according to Israel Radio. Included in the agreement is a controversial building that could house a future embassy in Jerusalem.

Signed by Ambassador William Brown and Israel Lands Authority Deputy Director Moshe Gatt, the agreement provides for twin buildings to be erected: one in the Talpiot area of West Jerusalem, and another in Tel Aviv.

Since 1948, the U.S. embassy has been located in Tel Aviv pending an international settlement of the status of Jerusalem. Currently, Washington maintains a large consulate-general in Jerusalem, but has not moved its embassy there despite Israeli requests.

Bush to Help in Migration of Ethiopian Jews

The head of the league of Ethiopian Jews in Israel, Haim Eliazar, told *Washington Jewish Week* that U.S. President George Bush will help in transferring 17,000 Jews from Ethiopia to Israel.

Israel Offered Ethiopia $83M in Military Hardware Last Year

On Thursday March 9, the Israeli daily *Hadashot*, quoting a European journal, reported that Israel provided Ethiopia with weapons worth about $83 million last year. Additionally, Israel has dispatched 300 military advisors to assist the Ethiopian troops in their fight against the rebels in Tigray and Eritrea.

Hadashot quoted the radio station of Eritrea's Popular Liberation Front as saying there are 38 Ethiopian pilots in Israel.

Another Palestinian Journalist Imprisoned

Sam'an Khouri of Jerusalem was arrested February 18, 1989, according to the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists. He is now being held at Petah Tikva, a well-known Israeli interrogation center, and is denied access to his lawyer.

Khouri, who works for Agence France-Presse, has been detained two other times since January 1988 without charge.

Arabic Weekly News Magazine Closed in Israel

The Israeli occupation authorities decided March 3 to withdraw the license of the Nazareth-based *Al-Raya* weekly and gave the newspaper's owners one week to liquidate their operation. The decision was made under the pretext that the newspaper was financed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

Al-Raya is operated by the Abna'a Al-Balad movement, a nationalist Palestinian organization operating inside the "green line." It began publication about 18 months ago.

Earlier the Israeli authorities closed another Arabic newspaper, *Tariq Al-Sharara*, claiming it was financed by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).

65 Percent of Israelis Favor Land-for-Peace Strategy

About two-thirds of Israeli Jews would return some occupied territory in exchange for peace, according to the Associated Press.

In a survey by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research and published in the *Jerusalem Post*, 65 percent of 1,192 Israeli Jews questioned were willing to give up at least part of the occupied lands. Of those, 17 percent wanted to return all or most of the Occupied Territories. Thirty-five percent opposed any territorial concessions, compared to 45 percent two years ago.

Asked whether Israel should agree if the United States exerts pressure on it to withdraw from most of the occupied lands, 73 percent said no. The figure has remained unchanged for the past 11 years, the polsters said.

53 Percent of Israelis Favor Talking to the PLO

A poll conducted by the Dahaf Institute in the first week of February, found that 53 percent of Israeli Jews favor talking to the PLO under certain conditions. Of that group, however, 38 percent said the PLO has not yet fulfilled its promises of renouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel, and that talks should only begin when those conditions are met. Another 15 percent of those polled by Dahaf said Arafat has lived up to his promises, and talks should begin immediately. Forty-two percent opposed talks with the PLO under any conditions.

The poll showed that 77 percent of the respondents oppose the formation of a Palestinian state, while 23 percent favor such a state. The results indicated a slight thaw in Israeli attitudes. A decade ago 90 percent of Israeli Jews opposed the formation of a Palestinian state.

Israel Bonds Sales Up

According to Meir Rosenne, the president and CEO of State of Israel Bonds, Israel Bonds sales in the United States and abroad set a new record of $631,078,000 for the year 1988, which represented an increase of $27 million over sales in 1987.

In 1984, Israel Bonds sales were $417 million; in 1985, $505 million; in 1986, $603 million; and in 1987, $604 million.

Marriages Up and Divorces Down in Occupied Palestine

There were more marriages and fewer divorces among Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1988, compared with 1987, the daily *Hadashot* reported on March 28, 1989.

A Gaza judge revealed that there were 8,300 marriages in 1988, compared with only 5,800 in 1987. Divorce cases dropped from 700 to 500 in the same period.

The rise in marriages is attributed to the falling dowry which the groom must pay to the bride, mainly due to the deteriorating economic conditions. The dowry, or in Arabic the Islamic *mahr*, dropped from an average of 3,000 Jordanian dinars in 1987 to only several hundred dinars.

Four-Year-Old Stone-Thrower Beaten and Father Arrested

On Monday, March 20, the Israeli army arrested 40-year-old Ahmad Mohammad Zakkan in Tulkarem, occupied Palestine. He was arrested after his four-year-old daughter was charged with pelting an army jeep. Soldiers beat the little girl, but her grandfather was able to talk the soldiers into releasing her.

50 Palestinian Children Released from Israeli Prisons

On April 5, 1989, the Israeli occupation authorities released 430 Palestinian detainees as an alleged "goodwill gesture" at the beginning of *Ramadhan*, the Islamic holy month. Since the release came during Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's visit to the United States, it is widely believed to be an attempt to score points in public relations.

Of those released, 50 were reported to be children between the ages of 12 and 16.



Technicians at a nuclear plant in Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Similar facilities where nuclear weapons are assembled are believed to be in operation in Israel's Negev Desert. photo courtesy of U.S. Air Force

NUCLEAR MARKET, from page 25

deuterium oxide, heavy water is a heavy isotope of hydrogen and is used in reactors to make plutonium from natural uranium. Despite Norway's efforts, which have been considerably more energetic than those of Britain, France, and West Germany, to control the heavy water's final destination, consignments of it have gone astray. After reports that Norwegian heavy water sold in 1983 to Hempel's West German company Rohstoff Einfuhr G.m.b.H. had been diverted to India, Norway announced that it had outlawed the export of heavy water.

Norway also embarked on an audacious confrontation with Israel. After the *Sunday Times* of London published details of Israel's nuclear weapons program in late 1986—these had been provided by Mordechai Vanunu, a former worker at the Dimona installation who was subsequently kidnapped by Mossad and sentenced by Israel to 18 years in prison—Norway began trying to enforce its contractual right to inspect 20 tons of heavy water it had sold Israel in 1959. Israel refused to let Norway inspect the nuclear reactor at Dimona.

Israel has been one of the main beneficiaries of the lax control of nuclear materials. It has constructed the world's sixth largest nuclear arsenal out of bits and pieces acquired from several countries.

The standoff lasted over a year. Then Israel appeared to bow to Norwegian pressure and offered to let Norway inspect 12 tons in barrels, saying that the rest of the 1959 consignment had been consumed over the years. However, it is widely believed this quantity is unused heavy water that Rumania, which maintains close relations with Israel, legally bought from Norway for a reactor that has not yet come on line.

Heavy water that has been used in a reactor would have traces of tritium, and if Norway found such traces it could reclaim the heavy water, since the 1959 sale was made on the condition of a "peaceful use" pledge from Israel. This, according to Professor Gary Milhollin, head of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, would force Israel to shut down the Dimona reactor.

Norway's effort to confront Israel is singular. Although there is legislation providing for a cutoff of U.S. aid to countries that make or export nuclear weapons (Israel has cooperated with South Africa on nuclear weapons since at least 1979, when the two nations jointly detonated a low-yield nuclear weapon over the South Atlantic Ocean) Washington has never had the stomach for calling Israel to account on this score. Many believe that by allowing Israel to develop a sophisticated nuclear arsenal the United States has forfeited the moral authority with which it once sought to lead a global nonproliferation effort. □

Wedding in Galilee

Suha Sabbagh

In 1987, the Palestinian filmmaker Michel Khleifi who grew up in Nazareth and is now living in Belgium, completed his critically acclaimed *Wedding in Galilee* (*Urs Al-Jalil*). The full-length feature has received numerous awards including the Cannes Film Festival's International Federation of Film Critics Award and two Belgian Film Awards for Best Belgiam Film and the Humanism Award.

In *Wedding in Galilee*, Khleifi addresses issues relating to social and political systems of authority. This time, his subject is a wedding in a village in the Galilee.

Wedding in Galilee comfortably and beautifully captures the consciousness and the modes of resistance developed by Palestinians living under Israel's military occupation. These modes of resistance are organic outgrowths of a culture that is deeply rooted in village life and tradition. Thus, holding a wedding with all the traditional requirements can become a symbol of survival and procreation against all the Israeli military governor's attempts to crush the joyous spirit of the occasion.

Originally, Khleifi set out to document the traditions surrounding marriage festivities. But, since politics and other aspects of human life are not distinct and compartmentalized in Palestinian villages, the film, aside from chronicling a wedding, incorporates other themes such as the cruelty of Israeli policies toward Palestinians, the power of love, a celebration of life in peasant communities, the role of women, plots against the military governor's life, political symbolism, and myth.

Life Under Occupation

Until 1966, the Israeli military administration governed all aspects of Palestinian life inside Israel. The indigenous population was not permitted to move freely between villages, and any type of associations and social gatherings were severely restricted. Therefore, the number of traditional weddings declined. The subsequent revival of traditional weddings, in one respect, can be construed as a political statement asserting Palestinian identity and culture.

In an attempt to demonstrate to the villagers their subjugated status, the military governor stipulates that he and his aides must be invited to attend the wedding.

Confrontation, however, is not perceived as a viable resolution to either social or political problems. Villagers who become aware of the plot to assassinate the Israeli military governor chastise and stop the youths involved. Likewise, the village's choice to continue with the wedding is a compromise, not a confrontation, between custom and military occupation.

Caught in a bind between the wish to honor his ancestors by holding a traditional wedding and the concessions he had to make to the military governor, the mukhtar seems to choose compliance with the demands of occupation. But the village does not completely give in to the military authorities. The military governor and his aides are

Suha Sabbagh holds a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Currently, she is researching and writing about the role of women in Palestinian literature.

present at the wedding, but they are never made to feel fully welcome, secure, or part of the festivities. With the methods at their disposal—wit, ruses, sarcasm, and jokes—the villagers fight back by making the military governor's stay most uncomfortable.

The episodes that follow are reminiscent of the tales told about Juha, a not very bright character in Arab folklore who is constantly tricked by his companions. The military governor becomes very alert and suspicious when a basket wrapped with a towel is brought near his table. When the basket is uncovered, all that he finds is a harmless toy. The villagers laugh and their merriment increases, and the military governor and his aides feel more alienated.

Finally, when the military governor and his aides depart from the village, they are flanked by villagers chanting and throwing objects—an expression of victory because the wedding took place. In the end, by defiantly continuing to celebrate life, the villagers win the day.

The dynamic between a culture secure by virtue of its long history on the land and the less-secure Israeli presence is further explored in Tali's dreamlike sequence. Tali is the only female Israeli soldier. The scene proposes the strength of a culture capable of transforming—nonconfrontationally—all conquerors.

Yet another scene explores the possibility of co-existence in a world where mutual respect would contribute to the sharing of knowledge. The mukhtar's Arabian horse accidentally escapes into a field mined by the Israelis in the vicinity of the village. The rescue operation is undertaken by the Israeli soldiers, in possession of a map identifying the location of each mine, and by the mukhtar, who employs the special skills available to a people that is well acquainted with the methods of coaxing a horse back to safety. The success of the operation hints at the possibilities of cooperation, in a land free of Israeli aggression, and where traditional and modern systems of knowledge could be integrated.

The Role of Women

Khleifi invests women with the collective memory of their culture. This collective memory plays a very important role in transforming the Israeli soldier, Tali. Overcome by the heat and the excitement of the day, Tali faints and is cloistered in the female quarters of the house.

In its dreamlike quality, the scene is reminiscent of Orientalist paintings of the Arab East. Yet, every detail of the care that Tali receives is derived from actual traditional practices in Palestinian villages. She is massaged with oils, incantations are recited at her bedside, and when she recovers she is clothed in a loose traditional Palestinian dress and jewelry.

In contrast with the anxiety-ridden morning, her military uniform, and her duties as a soldier, the interior of the cloister is safe. The scene proposes that the two peoples could, at some future date, live in peaceful harmony once a general feminization or emphasis on caring and trusting takes place in both cultures. It is the women, with their collective memory of their culture, who are entrusted with securing such a future.

More importantly though, at the core of his work, Khleifi wants to celebrate life. In addition, he does not perceive conflict, whether political or social, in confrontational terms. Consequently, the role of women he interprets in intermediational terms. The strength of the matriarch, especially, lies in her ability to reconcile between old

Samia, the bride, from a scene in Michel Khleifi's *Wedding in Galilee*.

patriarchal norms and emerging forms of greater liberation, between fathers and sons, between normalcy and life under occupation, and between tradition and modernity. Women bestow a sense of harmony and therefore also give reason to celebrate life.

The central female character symbolizing this intermediational role, is not the bride, as a western viewer might anticipate, but Um Adel, the bridegroom's mother and the mukhtar's wife. The film highlights the traditional power granted to older matriarchs in Palestinian culture.

For example, the mother uses her influence with her husband, the mukhtar, to advance the wedding date to satisfy her son's wishes to be swiftly united with his beloved. The mukhtar originally wanted to have the wedding at a later date.

At another time, Um Adel defends her husband's decision to accept the conditions set by the military governor. The young people in the community seem united against the military governor's conditions and they are

photo courtesy of Kino International

In Wedding in Galilee, *Khleifi addresses issues relating to social and political systems of authority. This time, his subject is a wedding in a village in the Galilee.*

opposed to the mukhtar's more compliant approach. And Adel, the bridegroom, did not want to go through with the wedding.

In these instances, Um Adel uses her position as matriarch alternatively to help her husband and her son achieve goals that are important to them. But more importantly, in both instances, she exhibits considerable influence in her role as resolver of conflicts. She helps to speed the wedding and she makes sure that in fact it does take place.

The bride, Samia, adheres to all traditions, some of which symbolize the dominant role of the male, one of them is showing proof of her virginity on the wedding night. Yet her sense of security and inner strength enable her to resolve a situation that might have proven embarrassing to her husband. Torn by his father's political subjugation to the military governor, the bridegroom is unable to achieve a sense of closeness with his bride on the wedding night.

Samia resolves the situation. She takes her own virginity. The father's honor is saved when, in accordance with village traditions, the blood-stained sheets, symbolizing the woman's honor and the man's virility, are displayed in the village.

Samia's inner strength contrasts with the more traditional role attributed to women inherent in this wedding tradition. The scene is carried out in an unoffensive manner, sensitively, respectful of local customs, and in line with the esthetic sensibilities of most film viewers.

But, Khleifi does not allow a cliché to become a single point of view. Through Sumaya, the sexually provocative and forceful daughter of the mukhtar, the film exposes a different kind of Palestinian woman who asserts her identity by challenging the nurturing and mediational role attributed to Samia and to the bridegroom's mother. Through her seductive behavior and her choice of dress in more contemporary attire, Sumaya presents a direct challenge to patriarchal norms.

Sumaya represents a more confrontational approach toward the authorities when she provocatively challenges the soldiers. Girlfriend to the youth who is plotting the assassination of the military governor during the wedding, Sumaya belongs to the young generation that favors more direct confrontation with social and political systems of authority. However, she realizes that an assassination would only net her boyfriend a prison sentence, foiling her plans to be married and thus rescued from her father's authoritarian rule. Therefore, she is against the plot to assassinate the military commander.

In Khleifi's work, the accuracy of time and place are sacrificed in order to express unity between Palestinians inside Israel and in other parts of occupied Palestine. The film was shot in villages both in the Galilee and on the West Bank. Curfews imposed by the military governor are a common occurrence in occupied Palestine, whereas, the last curfew imposed on Palestinian villages in Israel was in 1966. Mined fields were a consequence of the 1948 war; most were cleared soon afterward.

These historical and geographical inaccuracies in no way distort the portrayal of resistance methods specific to Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. And of course, the traditional wedding caught on film depicts the customs unique to villages in the Galilee. □

The History Behind the Intifadah

Hisham H. Ahmed

The Intifadah's most obvious objective is to end Israeli occupation. Since the *Intifadah* began on December 9, 1987, hundreds of Palestinians from all walks of life have been killed; tens of thousands of unarmed Palestinian civilians have been wounded; and thousands more have been denied a trial or any semblance of due process of law, arbitrarily arrested, and imprisoned in inhuman conditions. Palestinian hospitals, clinics, and maternity centers have been indiscriminately attacked; and grade schools, high schools, colleges, and universities in occupied Palestine have been closed. Yet the *Intifadah* continues. Why? What are its goals?

Like anything else, the *Intifadah* cannot be understood without examining the history that led to it. Similarly, the essence of Israel's brutal occupation cannot be understood in isolation from earlier Zionist colonial plans to deny the very existence of the Palestinians as a people.

Hisham H. Ahmed holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Imposing the Zionist Plan

The year 1917 is a landmark in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On November 2, 1917, the British government issued the notorious Balfour Declaration, promising "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." The indigenous people of Palestine had not been consulted, nor had their rights been taken into consideration.

Later, in 1919, the Paris Peace Conference dispatched the American King-Crane Commission to investigate the situation in Palestine and in other provinces of the former Ottoman Empire. The Commission reported, *inter alia*, that the establishment of a Jewish national home on Palestinian soil would represent a flagrant violation of the principle of self-determination.

President Woodrow Wilson also articulated this stance in his "Fourteen Points" address on January 8, 1918, as well as in his "Four Points" address of February 11, a month later. Furthermore, the King-Crane Commission concluded that the implementation of the Zionist program would result in the uprooting of the indigenous people of Palestine from their homeland.

Because its findings conflicted with Zionist goals, the King-Crane Commission's report was suppressed. After three years, in July 1922, President Wilson granted his biographer, Ray Stannard Baker, permission to publish its findings.

Ironically, in that same year, on September 11, 1922, the United States gave its unequivocal consent to the Zionist settlement of Palestine in the form of Joint Resolution No. 322 of the 67th Congress. And two years later, in the Anglo-American Convention of December 3, 1924, the United States gave its official approval to the Brititsh subjugation of Palestine under the mandate system. Thus, the Wilsonian notion of self-determination was denied the people of Palestine.

At that time, the population of Palestine was approximately

700,000. Of that number, 574,000 were Muslims, 70,000 were Christians, and 56,000 were Jews. The Balfour Declaration and the ensuing British and U.S. policies never mentioned the Muslim and Christian majority of Palestine. Rather, they always referred to the majority as the "non-Jewish communities." Along with Britain, the United States promised to help establish a national home for a predominantly immigrant minority in Palestine, and ignored the political rights of the indigenous people. In doing so, the United States violated a fundamental democratic principle which it has so often claimed to defend in the name of liberty and freedom.

The Palestinian people did not accept the Balfour Declaration. They knew that they would be denied their natural human rights if they were to be ruled by an alien minority. Thus, Palestinian resistance against British policies and Zionist plans mounted throughout the 1920s and thereafter. Popular resistance against the British and the immigrant Zionists did not abate. In fact, from 1919 to 1939, many uprisings took place, climaxing in the 1936 Palestinian civil disobedience and six-month strike against British policies. Until the *Intifadah*, this was the longest uprising in modern Palestinian history.

Britain, in turn, became more determined to suppress Palestinians, their liberties, and their right to independence. Between 1936 and 1939 the British deployed 200,000 troops in Palestine to serve this objective. Since the forceful suppression of Palestinian resistance proved to be unsuccessful, however, London followed its tradition of sending a fact-finding commission. In 1936, as World War II began its approach, the Peel Commission was sent to investigate the situation.



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Britain's tactic was to make it appear as if it had made compromises with the Palestinians. The real goal, however, was to consolidate progress toward Jewish statehood in Palestine by containing Palestinian resistance.

In the period during and after World War II, British repression of Palestine continued and the corresponding Palestinian struggle for self-determination intensified.

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations, under ominous pressure from the United States, and without consulting the indigenous Palestinian people, passed U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), partitioning Palestine into two states: one Jewish and the other Arab.

Critically assessing the role played by the United States in the adoption of U.N. Resolution 181 (II) and the implications of that resolution on Palestinian rights, Thomas A. Bryson, a Middle East scholar, wrote:

> When the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181 on 29 November 1947, providing for the partition of Palestine and the eventual creation of Israel, U.S. influence was a deciding factor in the passage of this measure—a measure that cast the principle of self-determination to the winds insofar as the Palestinian Arabs were concerned. The Jews, a minority of less than one-third and owning less than seven percent of the total land area of Palestine, were allotted 56 percent of that area.

Another critic, British journalist and author David Hirst wrote:

> The Arabs were to retain 4,300 square miles while the Jews, who represented one-third of the population and owned some 6 per cent of the land, were allotted 5,700 square miles. The Jews also got the better land; they were to have

the fertile coastal belt while the Arabs were to make do, for the most part, with the hills. Yet it was not the size of the area allotted to the Jews which pleased them—indeed, they regarded it as the "irreducible minimum" which they could accept—it was rather the fact of statehood itself. Conversely, it was not merely the size of the area they were to lose, it was the loss of land, sovereignty and an antique heritage that angered the Arabs.

The Palestinians felt cheated. But rather than try to ameliorate the situation, Israel compounded the tension with the Palestinians by its expansionist policies. In May 1948, the newly established state of Israel militarily occupied four-fifths of Palestine. The remainder came under Jordanian and Egyptian rule as secretly agreed, between King Abdullah of Jordan and Golda Meir. This remaining one-fifth of Palestine came under Israeli occupation in June 1967.

When Israel was established in May 1948, approximately 800,000 Palestinians were forcibly expelled from their homeland. They became stateless and homeless. Especially in the West, it is often argued that the Palestinians voluntarily left their homeland when the state of Israel was proclaimed. However, as even Israeli scholars themselves have discovered, this not true. Numerous official Israeli sources have provided details of a range of methods to systematically uproot Palestinians from their homeland and even exterminate them.

In 1948, entire Palestinian villages were totally wiped out



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by Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir—at that time the heads of the Irgun-Leumi Tzvi and the Stern Gang, respectively. In April 1948, Begin and Shamir led a Zionist terrorist group to massacre 254 Palestinian men, women and children in the village of Deir Yassin, and the Israelis "helped spread the word" to other villages that the massacre at Deir Yassin is only the first of many to come.

The thousands of Palestinians who have been massacred, as in 1976 at Tel Al-Zaatar and in 1982 at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, are not abstractions in the human memory or isolated incidents of history. They are a perpetuation of the Palestinian tragedy caused by the establishment of Israel.

The PLO

It is out of this ongoing suffering that the Palestinian resistance grew. One overriding Palestinian concern was that the international community grant recognition of its existence as a people and of the legitimacy to exercise its inalienable national rights in its homeland. Because this request was initially ignored, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964, and in 1965, a newly organized Palestinian armed struggle was launched by those Palestinians whose family members had been killed, and by those who themselves had been made refugees. Then, the respected Palestinian scholar Fayez Sayegh wrote:

> The Palestinian people—after sixteen years of dispersion and exile, during which it had reposed its faith in its return to its country in world conscience and international public opinion, in the United Nations, and/or in the Arab states—chose at last to seize the initiative. In 1964, it reasserted its corporate personality by creating the Palestine Liberation Organization (W. Laqueur and B. Rubin, eds., 1984: p. 168).

Before it came to accept the idea of a two-state solution in Palestine, the PLO set as its goal

the liberation of the entire Palestinian homeland and the establishment of a democratic, secular state for all who live there, irrespective of race and religion. Since its establishment, the PLO has gradually gained international recognition from the majority of nation-states in the international community. The Palestinian problem which was neglected for a long time, if remembered at all, or treated as a problem of scattered refugees, began to be viewed as a struggle for the retrieval of legitimate national rights.

In October 1974 the Arab summit held in Rabat declared that the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people is the PLO. On November 22 of that year, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 3236 in which it reaffirmed "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: (a) the right to self-determination without external interference; (b) the right to national independence and sovereignty"; and further recognized "that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

Both inside and outside occupied Palestine, Palestinians embrace the PLO as their sole legitimate representative. Palestinian allegiance to the PLO has been uninterrupted and steadfast in the face of Israeli military bombardments and U.S. policies in the area.

Nevertheless, there have been serious ongoing Israeli and U.S. attempts to find representatives for the Palestinian people other than the PLO. From the establishment of the "village leagues" in the early 1980s to the trumpeting of the "Jordan option," (see *The Return*, February 1989, p. 15). However, all such attempts have failed.

The Palestinian people have consistently paid a heavy price for asserting their right to independent representation of their own choosing. The *Intifadah* is the product of many decades of oppression and suffering: it is a declaration that a new stage of Palestinian struggle has commenced, in which resistance to the occupation will be centered in occupied Palestine. Furthermore, the *Intifadah* represents a reassertion of the solidarity between Palestinians under occupation and those in exile, the former being subjected to daily harassment by the Israeli occupation authorities, and the latter being marginalized in their places of residence, or worse, in refugee camps sometimes kept in inhuman conditions.

The *Muntafidoon* (Uprisers) set out to challenge and eradicate the psychological impasse created by the myth of Israeli invincibility. They also sent an unequivocal message to the Arab regimes who, in their November 1987 summit in Amman, had demoted the question of Palestine. In asserting Palestinian national unity and in affirming their right to choose the PLO as their sole legitimate representative, the Palestinians have proclaimed that their struggle cannot be conditioned upon Arab governments' support or upon dreamt-of fairness from the United States.

What is really happening now in occupied Palestine is a contest between the will of the indigenous people to assert their rights and the lust of the colonial power, Israel, to affirm its control. Naturally, one can predict that the occupier will use all the resources at its disposal to crush the challenges confronting it. By the same token, one would expect that the means the occupied people employ in the struggle will be adapted to correlate with the degree of injustice inflicted upon it. The more oppression Israel inflicts upon the Palestinian people, the more innovative and imaginative the Palestinian struggle will become. □

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BOOK REVIEW

The Hidden History of Zionism

Geoffrey D. Schad

Schoenman, Ralph. *The Hidden History of Zionism*. Santa Barbara: Veritas Press, 1988.

In this one short book, a veteran leftist political activist, Ralph Schoenman, attempts to offer a great deal: a Marxist analysis of Zionism as an ideology; a Marxist analysis of Israel as a state; an indictment of Israeli brutality toward the Palestinians; an exposé of expansionist Zionist plans for the Middle East; and a recommendation for Palestinian action.

Unfortunately, Schoenman's writing style is not up to his ambitious goals, and his recommendations are anachronistic in the wake of last November's Palestine National Council resolutions. Furthermore his title is inaccurate: the history he claims is "hidden" is in fact well documented, as evidenced by his extensive quotations from published sources.

All this is a great pity, as many Americans are unfamiliar with the subject matter, and, in the wake of the *Intifadah*, the Palestinian Uprising, a good general overview of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is sorely needed. Indeed, one wonders who Schoenman's intended audience is. For those who know the subject matter, Schoenman covers too much familiar ground. For uninformed general readers, his disjointed approach is confusing. This is not meant to impugn the author's intentions or integrity—it is only to state that Schoenman's book is not what it could have been.

After a brief preface on the *Intifadah*, written last April, Schoenman gets down to his historical analysis. He begins by debunking what he terms the "Four Myths" of Zionism. In order, the four myths are—Palestine is "a land without a people for a people without a land"; Israel is a democracy; security is the prime motivation for Israeli foreign policy; and Zionism is legitimized by the genocide of European Jews under the Nazis.

Focusing on these four myths is very important, as each has been used by Israel's apologists, particularly in the United States, to ensure the "blank check" support that Israel has enjoyed. It is important also to pose the idea that any opposition to "blank check" support, or any calls for justice for the Palestinians are not acts of thinly disguised "anti-Semitism."

The first myth is easy to dispel. Once the early Zionists realized that Palestine was in fact well populated, they were compelled to make the myth a reality: they expelled the Palestinians from their land.

Schoenman covers familiar topics in his account of the Israeli massacres of Palestinians during the war of 1948. He discusses the destruction of Palestinian villages and the confiscation of Palestinian property by the absentee property laws, the actions of the Jewish National Fund, and the terror tactics used by Ariel Sharon's Unit 101 during the 1950s and by the occupation authorities since 1967.

Israeli democracy is not assailed so directly. Indeed, one would have hoped for a more thorough treatment of Zionist and Israeli discrimination, both political and

Geoffrey D. Schad holds an M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University and is the editor of the Arab Press Bulletin.

economic, against "non-Jews"—the preferred term in Israel for the native population of Palestine. In addition, one would have also hoped for a more detailed account of *Ashkenazi* discrimination against the *Sephardim* and Oriental Jews. (The *Sephardim* are Jews originally from Spain and northern Africa, and Oriental Jews are from the Middle East. The *Ashkenazim* are European Jews.)

Zionist cooperation with the British colonial authorities during the mandate, the early-established links between Zionists and the white government of South Africa, and the collusion of Zionism (particularly the Revisionists within it) with fascism and Nazism are all used to support the idea of Israeli anti-democracy. Schoenman berates the Labor Zionist movement as a perversion of the workers' movement and condemns Zionism for its dependence on outside state power—the Ottoman Empire, Britain, France, and then the United States—for success.

The idea that Israel's security is under constant threat is dealt with by exposing Israeli aspirations to dominate much of the Middle East. Here, Schoenman makes an often-overlooked point, that maximalist Zionist aspirations are as much a feature of Labor Zionism as they are of Revisionist Zionism. The idea that Israel's patrimony extends from the Nile to the Euphrates is traced as far back as Theodor Herzl, and Israel's aspirations in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, as well as its plans for the destabilization of Iran, are revealed by pertinent statements made by David Ben-Gurion as early as 1938.

The argument could have been more detailed, but Schoenman performs a useful service by exposing the scope of Zionism's aspirations. After all, Likud politicians who complain that the recent Palestine National Council (PNC) resolutions did not renounce the Palestine National Covenant's claim to all of mandated Palestine themselves belong to a party which still believes that Jordan belongs to the Jewish people.

When analyzing Zionism's claim to speak for the victims of the Holocaust, most commentators make the obvious and correct point that there is no reason that the Palestinians should pay for the crimes of the Nazis. Schoenman goes a step further by exposing how elements of the Zionist movement, in particular the followers of Vladimir Jabotinsky, cooperated with both Italian fascists and German Nazis. This is controversial territory, but Schoenman guards his back by quoting extensively from Zionist leaders and footnoting every claim.

Regardless of the nature and extent of Zionist-Nazi collusion, Schoenman misses one obvious point: Zionism, by its insistence that Jews cannot live with Gentiles, is in fact an endorsement of "anti-Semitism's" central premise.

In his final chapter, "A Strategy for Revolution," Schoenman makes a strong argument, based on the rights of the Palestinian people and on an ideology of international anti-imperialism, for a democratic secular state in all of British-mandated Palestine. He excoriates proponents of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, and regards anything but the dismantling of Israel and its replacement by a democratic secular Palestine as treason to the Palestinian cause. He believes that such a state can be achieved through the solidarity of other oppressed peoples with the Palestinians, including Israel's Sephardic and Oriental Jewish underclass. He regards such a secular state as the vanguard of social revolution throughout the

Ralph Schoenman

The major problem with Schoenman's book is not its substance, but its presentation. More often than not, Schoenman lets others make his arguments for him.

Arab World.

While such an argument is the logical outcome of Schoenman's political beliefs and, arguably, the only way to achieve *absolute* justice for the Palestinians, it has been overtaken by events, specifically the PLO's recent reaffirmation of its recognition of Israel and its endorsement of a Palestinian state in the territories occupied since 1967. It is true that Zionism and the establishment of Israel represent a crime against the Palestinians, but politics is, after all, the art of the possible. The formation of a Palestinian state may be all that is achievable.

Notwithstanding, the major problem with Schoenman's book is not its substance, but its presentation. More often than not, Schoenman lets others make his arguments for him. When he needs a Marxist analysis of the social conditions in Palestine or of Zionist cooperation with the British, he quotes at length from Ghassan Kanafani (a noted poet and novelist, and spokesperson for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). Similarly, Zionist expansionism is revealed by pages of extracts from Moshe Sharett's diaries. Other examples of this cut-and-paste approach abound. Schoenman is not guilty of plagiarism but the evidence he uses to support his positions often overwhelms the author's own voice. Another problem is the structure of his approach. His attempt to demolish the myths of Zionism is scattered amidst digressions about Israeli torture, prisons, etc. A more compact and direct approach would greatly strengthen his argument.

Despite the generally accurate nature of Schoenman's historical evidence, some assertions are dubious and some characterizations misleading. His characterization of Zionism as a unique form of colonialism is not quite on the mark, as he fails to realize that ideologically motivated settler colonialism was more widespread than he would have us believe (the Puritan settlement of New England is a case in point). Certain concepts are treated anachronistically: he would have us believe that, in 1905, the World Zionist Congress acknowledged the existence of a specifically Palestinian, as opposed to Arab, national movement against the Ottomans, and that the British had promised the Arabs "self-determination," when in fact what they had done was cut separate deals with individual Arab rulers.

Finally, Schoenman has a fixation on the figure of Jabotinsky which works both for and against him. At one point he calls Jabotinsky one of Zionism's "ideological forebears," when he was in fact the father of Revisionism. Schoenman also asserts that Jabotinsky endorsed the Armenian genocide, but does not offer documentation for this claim. On the plus side, however, he shows us how Jabotinsky's metaphor of the "Iron Wall" became a useful concept for Zionists of all stripes, with various Israeli policies and plans being called "Iron Will," "Iron Arm," "Iron Brain," and "Iron Fist." His discourse on "The Metaphor of Iron" is one of the strongest parts of the book, and one wishes all Schoenman's writing was this evocative. □

ABU JIHAD, from page 5

every effort to free her husband and comrades.

Um Jihad is a member of the revolutionary council, the only woman to ever hold such a post. Her entrance into the PNC during the declaration of the State of Palestine caused a storm of welcome. People stood and applauded, and they stretched out their hands to touch Um Jihad, to shake her hand, to give her a kiss.

Um Jihad remembered the man who died to outlive the occupation and the suffering of his people. She spoke of how he was able to patiently unite the varied Palestinian political factions. And, with a tear in her eye, she remembered his last poem to her. It was found in his files a few days after his death. "Do not cry, do not scream," were his last written words to her. He foresaw his death.

In his poem, he saw himself liberated with the children of the *Intifadah*, on a white horse, wandering through the towns and cities of Palestine. For the occasion, Um Jihad had worn her embroidered Palestinian dress, though as she spoke, she was still in black, mourning.

In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, we joyously celebrated the proclamation of independence while Abu Ammar's and Abu Jihad's pictures were raised on top of every house, every school, every field, every mosque, and every church. In declaring independence for the Palestinian state, the long-lived hero of the revolution, the hero who carries a red tulip (which every Palestinian holds in his bosom), a tulip with an exquisite scent, that spreads the memory of pain, the future, and hope.

Abu Jihad was not a man who belonged to any one place on earth. Although Palestine was nearest to his heart, he was a brother combatant with all freedom fighters, wherever they are. He was a symbol for all revolutions to help

the oppressed. He believed in the legitimacy of revolutions, and the need for them to spread to liberate the oppressed. Thus, he was the first Palestinian leader to visit China. He was politically involved in Algeria where he learned his first lessons of revolutionary history—where he learned about the partnership role of women.

These ideas were not simply committed to paper, Abu Jihad carried them out. He believed in women as partners in the revolution, and as fighters. Intisar, his wife and cousin, was his comrade during all these years. And she continues in the path that she and her husband had once pursued together.□

YASSER ARAFAT, from page 10

Yasser Arafat's strength comes not only from within him and his character. It also comes from the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people have shown great strength in overcoming exile, persecution, and massacres for the last 40 years. Their steadfastness and willingness to struggle and survive explains Arafat's strength and endurance. He has said that "the Palestinian people are greater and stronger than all their leaders, present and future." He means that their will to survive and live as a free people is their strength. That is why Arafat is not a dictator, but a simple leader of a struggle for freedom. □

JOURNALISTS, from page 20

one soon. But if there is not, the *Intifadah* could turn into the first stage of a drive to reclaim the entire Palestinian birthright in Palestine, however "unrealistic" that goal may be.

After 14 years of getting absolutely nowhere with a peace offer, it is only natural that more and more Palestinians will join those who have believed for years, rightly or wrongly, that no amount of time will be long enough.

Journalists, take note. □

CURFEW, from page 23

from residents who allegedly owed licensing fees.

When border police called out through bullhorns that the curfew was being lifted "on an experimental basis," one Silwan resident, reluctantly leaving for his job, pondered: "Does that mean I can leave but they won't let me back in later?"

When any curfew order is lifted, only one thing is certain: like some virulent plague, it can come again, without any warning. Residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip are by now, curfew-savvy. Once a siege is lifted, they immediately tend to the urgent business of preparing for the next curfew by restocking foodstuffs, visiting a medical center if they need treatment of any kind, and returning to their jobs and fields. There is an overwhelming urge to open doors and step outside, perhaps just to savor once more the fresh air of "freedom," and to get on with the business of shaking off the occupation—and shaking off the use, or abuse, of curfew. □

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
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

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





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